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INTRODUCTION

The ever-increasing diffusion of institutional ownership is
reshaping corporate governance at publicly traded companies
worldwide.1 In line with this global trend, a key structural
development in recent years has been the growth of institutional
investors throughout the European Union, where corporate
ownership and voting are becoming increasingly institutionalized
and the relevance of other owner categories is decreasing.2 Indeed,
individual investors directly hold no more than 10-11% of the
market capitalization, while they held 28% in 1975, and the
proportion of retail investors among all shareholders is less than half
the level it was in the 1970s.3
In spite of the fact that the number of listed companies with a
controlling shareholder is still fairly high in the EU as well as in
other areas,4 institutional investors have become the dominant

1
See A. DE LA CRUZ ET AL, OWNERS OF THE WORLD’S LISTED
COMPANIES 5 (2019), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Owners-of-theWorlds-Listed-Companies.pdf.
2
Id. at 11 (noticing that “in European listed companies strategic
individuals and families own 8% of the total market capitalisation; the
public sector owns 9%; private corporations own 13%; institutional
investors own 38% and the remaining ownership share corresponds to
other free-float including retail investors.”). See also OBSERVATOIRE DE
L’ÉPARGNE EUROPÉENNE [OEE] & INSEAD OEE DATA SERVICE [IODS],
UNDER THE TENDER: WHO OWNS THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY? EVOLUTION OF
THE OWNERSHIP OF EU-LISTED COMPANIES BETWEEN 1970 AND 2012, 55
(2013), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/db5b2604-e1d7-11e5-8a50-01aa75ed71a1/language-en.
3
See Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan on Building a Capital
Markets Union, at 18, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015).
4
See Julian Franks, Institutional Ownership and Governance, EUR.
CORP. GOVERNANCE INST., Feb. 12, 2020, at 5-8,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530849 (click
“Open PDF in Browser”).

4

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

VOL. 17.1

owners of public equity,5 as they “hold 41% of global market
capitalisation and in advanced economies they have also become
significant owners in individual companies.”6
The rise in institutional ownership in the EU has come with a
significant impact on European issuers’ corporate governance.
Crucially, institutional investors have grown into prominent players
in corporate voting. Indeed, voting turnout at European general
meetings increased over the last decade,7 chiefly as a consequence
of institutional investors’ more active engagement with investee
companies, including voting.8 On EU-average, the level of voter
turnout increased by some 10% between 2008 and 2018, from
60.4% to 70.2%, “including an increase of more than one
percentage point from 2017 to 2018.”9 In many EU Member
States, such an outcome was driven to a significant degree by the

5
Christoph Van der Elst, The Corporate Response to Shareholder
Activism, 15 ERA F. 229, 231 (2014) (noting that over the last several
years “large companies in several continental European countries have
experienced a significant drop in ownership concentration levels,” and
“the ownership structure of the largest companies became more
dispersed.”).
6
DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
7
See European Securities and Markets Authority, Undue Short-Term
Pressure on Corporations, at 56 (ESMA30-22-762) (Dec. 18, 2019)
(stating that “evidence collected at national level shows that both the
attendance and exercise of voting rights in the shareholders’ meeting have
picked up in certain cases […]. However, this tendency is not consistent
across countries, mainly due to entrenched and markedly differing sets of
rules and approaches to holding general meetings which frequently
provide barriers to foreign shareholder participation in meetings.”).
8
See Serdar Celik & Mats Isaksson, Institutional Investors and
Ownership Engagement, 2013/2 OECD J. FIN. MKT. TRENDS 93, 94
(2013), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/institutionalinvestors-and-ownership-engagement_fmt-2013-5jz734pwtrkc#page1.
9
ARNAUD CAVÉ ET AL., INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, INC.,
EUROPEAN VOTING RESULTS REPORT 2 (2018),
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/2018_European_Voting_
Results_Report.pdf.
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mandatory implementation, following the 2007 SRD I, 10 of the
record date regime throughout the Union,11 by enhanced regulatory
and market pressure on institutional investors and asset managers to
take on stewardship responsibilities as a part of intermediaries’
investment management activities,12 and by the rise of the proxy
advisory industry.
Proxy advisory services—particularly proxy analysis and
voting recommendations—are a cost-effective solution to help
institutions comply with stewardship and voting requirements.
Proxy analysis fills information gaps and, for a fee, provides relief
from the costly and time-intensive work required to gather and
process the relevant information; voting recommendations
ultimately provide a cognitive shortcut helping client investors to
make informed voting decisions and be compliant with regulatory
requirements that enhance institutions’ stewardship and engagement
role with investee companies. More so, the notion that proxy
advisors wield influence on voting outcomes is widespread in

10

Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in
listed companies, 2007 O.J. (L 184) 17 [hereinafter SRD I].
11
See, e.g., Christoph Van der Elst, Shareholders as Stewarts:
Evidence of Belgian General Meetings 5 (Fin. Law Inst. Working Paper
Series, WP 2013-05, 2013), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2270938 (assuming
that the increase in attendance rates at Belgian listed companies’ 2012
annual meetings “is due to the abolishment of the ‘blocking of shares’”).
Prior to the SRD I, share blocking during a certain period prior to the
general meeting, and up to the end of the meeting, was a requirement for
participation and voting in many Member States. Share blocking was
found to inhibit institutional shareholder voting since it overly restricted
the ability to trade shares and was therefore prohibited and replaced by a
system based on a “record date” (Article 7 of SRD I) under which only
shareholders of record as of a specified cut-off date in advance of the
general meeting are entitled to vote, irrespective of whether such
shareholders will actually still hold their shares on the day of the meeting.
12
See ARNAUD CAVE ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 2.
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Europe.13 For example, as far as Italy is concerned, it is especially
worth noting that the Italian Supervisory Market Authority (Consob)
found that the effect of proxy advisors on investors’ voting
regarding say-on-pay is “at least as strong as (and probably stronger
than) that observed in the US,” consistent with the weight of foreign
institutions in the shareholder base of Italian listed companies and
with the features of listed companies in terms of small or medium
cap firms on a comparative basis. 14
European corporate ownership is also growing ever more
international, with non-EU shareholders—most of which are
institutional intermediaries—holding about 44% of the shares issued
by companies listed in the EU.15 Given that a substantial proportion
of the shares under foreign ownership is held by large U.S.-based
investors,16 this factor has, not unpredictably, fueled voting at

13
See Eur. Comm'n, Green Paper on The EU Corporate Governance
Framework, COM (2011) 164 final (Apr. 5, 2011); Eur. Comm'n,
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council
amending Directive2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of longterm shareholder engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain
elements of the corporate governance statement, 2, COM (2014) 0213
final, (2014) 0121 (COD), (Apr. 9, 2014) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n,
Explanatory Memorandum]; EUR. SEC'S MKT. AUTH., AN OVERVIEW OF
THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY. CONSIDERATIONS ON POSSIBLE POLICY
OPTIONS 17 (ESMA/2012/212, No. 66) (Mar. 22, 2012); EUR. SEC'S MKT.
AUTH., FINAL REPORT. FEEDBACK STATEMENT ON THE CONSULTATION
REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE PROXY ADVISORY INDUSTRY 12 (ESMA
2013/84) (Feb. 19 2013).
14
Massimo Belcredi et al., Proxy Advisor and Shareholders
Engagement. Evidence from Italian Say-on-Pay 26-28 (CONSOB,
Working Paper no. 81, 2015), ssrn.com/abstractid=2616258.
15
Eur. Comm'n, Explanatory Memorandum, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 3. See also DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 14.
16
See DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 15, fig 6. Regarding Italy see NADIA LINCIANO ET AL., 2016
REPORT ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES, 1314 (CONSOB Statistics and Analyses) (2016),
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European corporations. In effect, also due to a number of regulatory
measures adopted over time, U.S.-based institutions have a longerstanding tradition of being more active voters.
Within the institutionalized scenario for corporate ownership
and voting in the EU, the Italian landscape is no exception, in spite
of concentrated corporate ownership of publicly listed corporations
and the fact that Italy’s stock market development still lags behind
other European countries.17 According to the OECD, “[t]he
proportion of households’ financial assets managed by institutional
investors has been growing in recent years.”18 If, in 2017, “only
one-third of Italian households’ financial assets were managed by
institutional investors compared to 40% in the Euro area and twothirds in the United Kingdom,” this is largely because the share of
household financial assets held by pension funds is low compared

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947709 (reporting that, at the end of 2015,
institutional investors were major shareholders in nearly 36% of the
market, holding on average 6.9% of the share capital in 83 firms; foreign
institutional investors owned major holdings especially in larger firms and
in the financial sector). Referred to the UK, see OFF. FOR NAT'L STAT.,
OWNERSHIP OF UK QUOTED SHARES: 2016, para. 3, 5, 11,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/investmentspensionsandtrusts/bulletins/
ownershipofukquotedshares/2016.
17
At the end of 2018, total market capitalisation decreased by 15
percent compared to 2017, reaching around 542 billion euros; companies
listed on the MTA increased slightly, from 237 to 240, as also did those
traded on the AIM Italia-MAC market, from 95 to 113. See COMMISSIONE
NAZIONALE PER LE SOCIETÀ E LA BORSA (CONSOB), REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OF ITALIAN LISTED COMPANIES 2019 5-6 (2020),
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/report-on-corporategovernance [hereinafter CONSOB REPORT 2019]. See also ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW OF ITALY 2020:
CREATING GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES FOR ITALIAN COMPANIES AND SAVERS
17, 23 (2020), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/OECD-Capital-MarketReview-Italy.pdf [hereinafter OECD] (noticing that “During the last ten
years, on average less than four companies per year became listed on the
regulated market of the Italian stock exchange and the Italian market
capitalisation as per cent of GDP remains well below that of its European
peers.”).
18
OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 42.
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to other European peers.19 In fact, private pension plans are merely
voluntary in Italy, and the public pension system is predominant.
As regards ownership structure, Consob found that, by the end
of 2018, 203 out of 231 companies listed on the Italian Stock
Exchange (accounting for 88% of the total number of publicly listed
corporations) were controlled companies, and about 77% of which
were controlled by a single stockholder holding either more than
half of the share capital (123 companies) or a lower stake (57
firms).20 Consob also reported that the ultimate controlling agent is
the family in 152 listed firms, accounting for the 33% of the market
capitalization; the State (and other local authorities) in 23 large
companies (37.8% of the market capitalization); a financial entity in
11 cases (mainly small firms).21
Non-controlled, widely held companies are thus clearly still
limited in number, although they grew from 11 in 2010 to 13 in 2018
(5.6% of the total number of listed firms, representing 20.5% of
market capitalization).
Concentrated ownership is also an
explanation for the low free-float ratios in the Italian regulated
market.22 Ultimately, however, “the differences between the
concentration level of the Italian listed corporate sector and those of
France, Germany, and Spain are insignificant.”23 Moreover, the use
of control-enhancing mechanisms in Italian listed companies

19
Id. (emphasizing that “[t]he assets held by Italian pension funds
account for a modest 9.4% of GDP, which is far below the OECD average
of 50.7%.”).
20
See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 13.
21
Id. at 16.
22
See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 34
(illustrating that “[a]t 60%, the Italian stock market has the lowest freefloat ratio among comparable European countries and well below the
European average of 75%. Moreover, only 29% of the companies listed in
the Italian regulated market have more than 50% of their shares readily
available in the market (free float), compared to 41% in France and 45%
in Germany.”).
23
Id., at 94.
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significantly decreased over the last twenty years. 24 Indeed, in 2016,
18.2% of MTA-listed issuers belonged to pyramidal or mixed
business groups compared to 44% in 1998.25 In addition, while
nonvoting shares gradually decreased over time,26 three firms have
provided for a category of multiple voting shares and forty-seven
issuers have introduced loyalty shares in their bylaws. 27
In line with the trend observed in other countries, despite the
predominance of controlled companies, institutional investors are
relevant shareholders in a not-negligible number of Italian listed
companies.28 As the OECD confirmed, “in Italy, institutional
investors hold, on average, lower stakes in listed companies
compared to the global average (41%), but at similar levels with
many European peers.”29 In fact, institutional investors hold
relevant stakes in sixty companies listed in Italy, accounting for
26.9% of the market.30 Noticeably, Italian institutional investors are
relevant shareholders31 in twelve companies only, whereas foreign

24
See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 22.
25
See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 20.
26
Id., at 14, 21 (reporting non-voting shares were issued by 14 listed
companies by the end of 2018, compared to 70 by the end of 1998, and
120 by the end of 1992).
27
Id. (showing that “[l]oyalty shares have vested their increased
voting power (active loyalty shares) in 28 firms, where the leverage and
the wedge are equal respectively to 1.3 and to 12%”).
28
See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
29
OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 92 (with
institutional investor ownership weighted by total market capitalization as
of end 2018 averaging 26.9% in Italy, compared to 27.5% in France,
28.3% in Germany, 26.5% in Spain, 38.3% in Sweden, 23.1% in Norway,
and 32.1% in Finland—but 61.0% in the United Kingdom).
30
Id.
31
For the purposes of Consob’s statistics, major institutional
investors are defined as investment funds, banks and insurance companies
subject to reporting obligations according to Consob rules and whose
shareholdings are lower than 10%.
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institutional investors hold relevant stakes in fifty-one companies.32
In effect, domestic and foreign ownership of publicly listed equities
evolved along opposite lines over the last decade, with Italian
institutions’ holdings steadily decreasing since 2011, and
nonresident institutions’ holdings increasing and stabilizing since
2015 onwards.33 National and foreign institutional share ownership
differ also in regard of the size of investee companies and the
industry they belong to. Italian institutions tend to more frequently
concentrate major stakes on small-sized and industrial companies,
while foreign institutions’ investments rather target large firms and
the financial industry, with 35% of FTSE MIB firms,34 and 25% of
financial industry firms, featuring major foreign holdings. 35 Such

32
CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 19-20.
33
See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 17
(illustrating that “[t]he limited size of the Italian market is also reflected in
the fact that only 7% of the Italian institutional investors’ portfolios were
invested in corporate shares and bonds issued by Italian firms at the end of
2017. Instead, Italian investors had directly or indirectly through foreign
investment funds, allocated around EUR 190 billion to equity investments
in foreign firms. In terms of value, this sum represents almost two-thirds
of the total free-float market capitalisation of all Italian listed
companies.”).
34
See FTSE MIB, BORSA ITALIANA,
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/borsa/indici/indici-incontinua/dettaglio.html?indexCode=FTSEMIB&lang=en (last visited Mar.
17, 2020) (“The FTSE MIB is the primary benchmark index for the Italian
equity markets capturing approximately 80% of the domestic market
capitalization . . . The FTSE MIB Index measures the performance of 40
Italian equities and seeks to replicate the broad sector weights of the
Italian stock market.”).
35
CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 19-20. According to further Consob Staff analysis, institutional
ownership in the 100 largest non-financial companies publicly listed in
Italy by active national and foreign asset managers (mutual, sovereign, and
hedge funds) averaged 13.5% over the period 2010-2015 (compared to
15% in Spain, through to nearly 25% in France and Germany, and up to
nearly 50% in the UK); see Francesco Fancello et al., Non-bank
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divergent evolutionary patterns for domestic and foreign
institutional ownership might possibly be explained by the fact that
corporate ownership of publicly listed companies in the financial
industry, especially the banking industry, is radically different from
that of industrial companies. At the end of 2014, only six listed
banks were actually controlled companies, whereas the remaining
twelve, accounting for 21% of the total market capitalization, were
either widely held companies or cooperative companies, which
typically feature one-member-one-vote voting structures.36 In turn,
dispersed bank ownership was largely a consequence of the
privatization process the industry underwent over the 1990s, which
then triggered large-scale acquisitions and mergers.37
In line with the developments at the EU level, the increasing
weight of institutional investors within the shareholder base of
Italian listed companies has been accompanied by a tendency for
investors to be more active owners. In 2018, the annual general
meeting season recorded record highs in terms of the share capital
represented at the meeting (72.6% on average) and the institutional
investors’ participation (exceeding 21% of the company’s capital).38
Over the period 2012-2018, institutional investors’ attendance rates
grew significantly in terms of the investors attending and the
percentage of the share capital represented at the meeting. 39
Significantly, foreign institutions have attended the meetings of all
of the hundred largest Italian companies since 2015; in 2018, they
cast on average around 29% of the votes.40 More so, in the 2018

institutional investors’ ownership in non-financial companies listed in
major European countries 7-29, (CONSOB, Working Paper No. 86 2018),
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/wp86.pdf/e12aebb0-3f2c45b7-964c-71d0198a8613.
36
See Angela Ciavarella et al., La corporate governance delle società
quotate italiane. Focus sul settore bancario [Corporate governance trends
in Italian listed banks], BANCARIA 82, 82 (It.) (Apr. 2016),
https://bancaria.it/assets/PDF/2016-04.pdf.
37
Id. at 84-85.
38
See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 40-41.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 7.
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proxy season, institutional investors collectively held a majority of
the votes cast at the general meetings at one-third of the thirty-five
most capitalized Italian listed companies.41 Altogether, as noticed
by Consob, “[l]arger institutional investors or those with a stronger
stewardship vocation are increasingly active in direct
communication with companies for a number of issues, including
corporate governance. In addition, investors have shown increasing
interest in issuers' approach to social and environmental issues.” 42
The Italian experience clearly shows that the structure of
corporate ownership does not necessarily affect shareholder
engagement with investee companies and that non-activist
institutional investors can play a major stewardship role also in
concentrated ownership contexts. Indeed, institutional investor
engagement with Italian publicly listed corporations is not only
focused on a few companies with widely dispersed ownership and
no one shareholder holding a stake large enough to secure voting
control but also concerns controlled companies, where a stockholder
or a coalition of shareholders hold the (absolute or relative) majority
of the votes.
Importantly, the Italian case also helps explain how the
regulatory framework can contribute to create an environment
favorable to non-activist institutional investors’ active ownership.
The Italian regime for corporate elections at listed companies is
particularly illustrative of this aspect. In fact, the right to appoint
directors on the board is key to encourage institutional investors’
stewardship at controlled companies and has proven to be one of the
most effective means of ensuring consideration for minority
interests and enhancing oversight over the controlling shareholders
or management. More generally, at Italian companies, institutional
investors can exercise a wider range of powers granted to the
shareholders as compared to the powers available to U.S.

Antonella Olivieri, ‘L’avanzata dei fondi: in Borsa comandano in
una blue chip su tre’ [The rise of mutual funds: They control one third of
blue chips], IL SOLE24ORE (It.) (Aug. 4, 2019).
42
See Annual Report 2018, CONSOB 5, 25 (2019),
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/ar2018.pdf/cdc8a77f-f0964e92-af53-94305683aec9.
41
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shareholders. Institutions can exert pressure on the controlling
shareholder and the company’s management by exploiting further
minority shareholder rights provided for under national law, such as
say-on-pay votes and the enhanced role to be played by the
shareholders in the context of related party transactions.
All the above confirms that there is indeed a link between
shareholders’ rights and institutions’ ability to engage convincingly
with investee companies regarding corporate governance. Given
that, in recent years, controlled companies have been on the rise at
the international level, partly as a consequence of going public with
a dual-class structure,43 the issue this Article deals with is of interest
for many countries, including the U.S., where controlled companies
“constitute a sizeable minority of large, publicly[-]traded firms.”44

43

See Clifford G. Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the
United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377, 1378 (2009); Ronald J. Gilson,
Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the
Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1660 (2006); Ronald J.
Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment,
43 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 119, 119-20 (2015); María Gutiérrez & Maribel
Sáez Lacave, Strong Shareholders, Weak Outside Investors, 18 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 277, 281 (2018) (noting that “[a]s controlled firms grow in
importance, tunneling, self-dealing, and other types of investor
expropriation could become significant concerns in the US.”).
44
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and
Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (2017); see also
Albert H. Choi, Concentrated Ownership and Long-Term Shareholder
Value, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 54-56 (2018); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan
Schwartz, Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 119, 119-20 (2015); Jens Dammann, The Controlling
Shareholder's General Duty of Care: A Dogma that Should Be
Abandoned, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 479, 483 (2015); Edward Kamonjoh,
Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Follow-up
Review of Performance & Risk, IRRC INST. 15 (2016),
https://www.issgovernance.com/library/controlled-companies-standardpoors-1500-follow-review-performance-risk/ (reporting that, as of October
2015, 7% of the constituents of the S&P 1500 index were controlled firms:
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Against this backdrop, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II
briefly draws the Italian basic corporate governance framework.
Building on the Italian case, Part III sets the scene by illustrating
how minority-empowering shareholder rights can contribute to
creating an environment favorable to non-activist institutional
investors active ownership. While acknowledging that not all of the
many tools introduced by the Italian legislature have proven
successful in driving increased institutional investor engagement
with Italian investee companies, it shows that some indeed have, as
is most notably the case for say-on-pay votes, alongside the record
date regime with regards to attendance at the shareholder meeting
and the slate voting system with regards to director elections. Part
IV follows up on the previous analysis by reporting some evidence
regarding the practice of shareholder voting and engagement in
Italy. Part V illustrates how the rise in activist, hedge fund-driven
intervention can impact non-activist institutions’ stewardship role at
controlled companies. Part VI sets out some concluding remarks.

II. SETTING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR-ORIENTED

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE ITALIAN BASIC
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The basic regulatory framework for shareholder voting and
engagement in Italy is set by the Civil Code, applicable to any
corporation, and Legislative Decree No. 58 of February 24, 1998
(so-called Consolidated Law on Finance – Testo unico della finanza,
hereinafter referred to as ‘CLF’), which lays down additional rules
for publicly listed corporations. Regulations implementing the CLF

“there are two primary control mechanisms in the updated study group: 1)
multi-class capital structures with unequal voting rights (78 study
companies); and 2) control through ownership of at least 30 percent of a
class of single-vote stock by a person or group (27 firms).”).
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are drawn by Consob, the Italian Financial Markets Supervisory
Authority.45
Another distinctive feature of the corporate governance
framework in Italy and in other European countries is the crucial
played by soft law.46 As far as Italy is concerned, the Corporate
Governance Code sponsored by Borsa Italiana, the Italian Stock
Exchange, provides for nonbinding best practice principles and
recommendations applicable to publicly listed companies based on
a comply-or-explain approach that is explicitly endorsed by the
law.47 In effect, under Article 123-bis(2)(a) CLF, publicly listed
corporations are required, ahead of the annual general shareholder
meeting, to publicly file a corporate governance report detailing,

45
See Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (Consob),
Regulation no. 11971 of May 14, 1999 (Regulation implementing Italian
Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 February 1998, concerning the discipline
of issuers), http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/reg11971e.htm?hkeywords=&docid=2
&page=0&hits=21&nav=false [hereinafter Consob Regulation No.
11971]. Additional rules and regulations relevant to corporate governance
may also apply, depending on the industry the company belongs to. Most
noticeably, banks and the parent companies of banking groups are subject
to a set of rules set by Legislative Decree No. 385 of September 1, 1993
(so-called Consolidated Law on Banking – Testo unico bancario), as well
as the Bank of Italy in implementing Circular no. 285 of December 17,
2013 (‘Disposizioni di vigilanza per le banche’), as subsequently
amended. Similarly, insurance companies are subject to specific rules
imposed on them by Legislative Decree No. 209 of September 7, 2005
(so-called Private Insurance Code – Codice delle assicurazioni private)
and implementing regulations set by Ivass, the supervisory authority.
46
Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law 2018 24-26 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 460/2019, 2019)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421389.
47
First released in 1999, the Corporate Governance Code was
updated several times; most recently, the Code underwent major reviews
following the model of the UK Stewardship Code 2020. The new January
2020 version of the Italian Code will apply starting in 2021. See CORP.
GOVERNANCE COMM., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE (2020),
https://www.borsaitaliana.it/comitato-corporategovernance/codice/2020eng.en.pdf.
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amongst other things, compliance with the Corporate Governance
Code, or explaining the reasons for not adopting any of the Code’s
provisions. Based on corporate governance reports, 94% of the
companies listed on the MTA (the leading regulated equity market
managed by Borsa Italiana for mid and large-size companies48) on
December 31, 2018 had adopted the then current version of the
Corporate Governance Code.49 Eleven out of the fourteen
companies not adopting the Code referred to specific firm
characteristics—particularly small size and concentrated
ownership—as an explanation for the determination not to adopt the
Code.
Traditionally, the Italian corporate structure is based on the
shareholder-elected board of directors,50 which may delegate
managing powers to a executive managing director or an executive
committee,51 and the board of statutory auditors (collegio

48

Borsa Italiana currently manages three equity markets, with
companies being listed on Mercato Telematico Azionario (MTA) and
Alternative Investment Market (AIM Italia), and financial vehicles being
listed on the Market for Investment Vehicles (MIV) and the Partnership
Equity Markets. As of end 2018, 242 companies were listed on MTA and
113 on AIM Italia. The MTA market is split into two segments, the
Standard listing segment and the Star segment, which requires additional
corporate governance standards to be adopted and is open to companies
that have less than EUR 1 billion market capitalisation. See OECD, OECD
CAPITAL MARKET REVIEW OF ITALY 2020: CREATING GROWTH
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ITALIAN COMPANIES AND SAVERS, 33 (2020),
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/OECD-Capital-Market-ReviewItaly.pdf.
49
See ASSONIME & EMITTENTI TITOLI, REPORT ON CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN ITALY: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ITALIAN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE CODE, 4 (2019),
http://www.assonime.it/_layouts/15/Assonime.CustomAction/GetPdfToUr
l.aspx?PathPdf=http://www.assonime.it/attivitaeditoriale/studi/Documents/nsexecutivesummary.pdf.
50
See Codice civile [C.c.] [Civil Code] art. 2364 (It.) (laying down
the decision-making authority of the shareholders meeting, amongst which
the appointments to the board of directors and the board of statutory
auditors).
51
See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2381 (It.).
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sindacale). The board of directors thus includes executive and
nonexecutive members elected for a term of up to three years.52 The
board of statutory auditors, whose members are elected by the
shareholders as well, is in charge of overseeing compliance with the
law and the adequacy of the company’s organizational and
accounting systems.53 If it is considered that nonexecutive members
of the board of directors chiefly play a supervisory role, given that
most of the management functions are delegated to executives,
Italian listed companies feature a corporate structure which, as a
matter of fact, owes most of its substantive inspiration to the AngloAmerican one-tier board system, rather than the German two-tier
system. The board of statutory auditors cannot be regarded as a
functional equivalent to the German Aufsichtsrat, since, unlike the
latter, it lacks any power to interfere with the board of directors’
decision making, either strategic or managerial, and are left alone
the power to appoint the members of the board of directors.
Following a wide-reaching company law reform enacted in
2003, a corporation may choose to adopt a one-tier or a two-tier
management and control system as an alternative to the traditional
structure, which applies as a default rule unless it is opted out in the
articles of association.54 Under the one-tier structure, an oversight
committee is appointed within the shareholder-elected board of
directors, whose members must be nonexecutive and independent.55
Under the two-tier structure, a supervisory board is elected
alongside the management board. The supervisory board is elected
by the shareholders, whereas the authority to elect the members of
the management board is vested with the supervisory board. 56
Additional powers vested with the supervisory board render the
Italian two-tier system the nearest equivalent the German model,
though differences persist. Despite the availability of such set of

52

See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2388 (It).
See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2400, 2403, and 2403-bis (It.).
54
See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2380, 2409-octies, and 2409-sexiesdecies
53

(It.).
55

See C.c. [Civil Code] art. 2409 septiesdecies and 2409-optiesdecies

56

See C.c. art. 2409-novies and 2409-duodecies.

(It.).
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corporate structures, more than fifteen years after reform, the vast
majority of Italian listed companies have maintained the traditional
corporate structure. At the end of 2017, Italian listed companies
adopting the traditional corporate structure accounted for 91% of the
market capitalization, with just four firms adopting the one-tier
structure or the two-tier structure.57 We will, therefore, only refer to
the so-called traditional corporate structure under which corporate
power is vested with the board of directors, while the shareholders
are essentially intended to take on a monitoring role to be backed up
by the board of statutory auditors.
The fact that the board of directors is key within the corporate
structure does not, however, entail the irrelevance of the
shareholders meeting. The shareholders meeting actually retains its
role as the ultimate tool for director accountability, since it holds the
power, above all, to elect (and remove) the members of the board of
directors and to approve any amendments to the articles of
association.58 It should be noted that, within corporate ownership
structures characterized by the principal-principal agency problem,
such as those of many Italian listed companies,59 shareholder
monitoring becomes a matter of minority oversight and minority
challenges to the authority of the board and the controlling
stockholders. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the evolutionary process
that the national corporate governance regulation underwent
historically, ever since the enactment of the unified Civil Code in
1942, through to the 1998 CLF and further subsequent
developments, including the transposition of SRD I and SRD II, 60
has been a process strongly shaped around the direct and indirect
empowerment of minority shareholders: whether by enhancing

57

See CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 17.
58
See C.c. art. 2364 and 2365 (laying down the decision-making
powers that rest with the shareholders meeting, either ordinary or
extraordinary).
59
See infra Part II.
60
See Council Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 17 May 2017 Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder Engagement,
2017 O.J. (L 132/1) 3 [hereinafter SRD II].
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minority shareholder rights and prerogatives, supporting minority
shareholders’ actual ability and even willingness to exercise those
rights, or strengthening oversight by the board of statutory auditors
and further gatekeepers.
A parallel force shaping corporate governance in Italy is the
development of financial intermediaries’ regulation, starting from
reforms enacted in 1974 (which established the Consob as the
national financial markets supervisory authority) onwards. With the
aim of ensuring end-investor protection, intermediaries’ regulation
has wielded indirect influence on corporate governance. In a
context increasingly characterized by intermediated investments,
regulation has progressively focused on institutional investors as
owners and has enhanced their oversight role, especially regarding
voting obligations.61 Regulatory action in this area is further
supported by self-regulation. Following the EFAMA Stewardship
Code,62 first adopted in 2011, Assogestioni, the Italian asset
managers’ non-profit association, adopted Stewardship Principles in
2013. The Italian Stewardship Principles were last revised in
2016.63 In line with the EFAMA Code, as well as a growing number
of similar stewardship initiatives, the Italian Stewardship principles
target collective investment management and portfolio management
companies with the aim of “promot[ing] discussion and cooperation
between Investment Management Companies and listed companies

61

See infra Part III.A.
See EUR. FUND AND ASSET MGMT ASS’N, STEWARDSHIP CODE.
PRINCIPLES FOR ASSET MANAGERS’ MONITORING OF, VOTING IN,
ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTEE COMPANIES (2018),
https://www.efama.org/Publications/Public/Corporate_Governance/EFAM
A%20Stewardship%20Code.pdf.
63
MASSIMO BELCREDI & LUCA ENRIQUES, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
ACTIVISM IN A CONTEXT OF CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND HIGH
PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: THE CASE OF ITALY 8–9 (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. (ECGI), Law Working Paper No. 225/2013 2014)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2325421; See
ASSOGESTIONI, ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE AND VOTING RIGHTS IN LISTED COMPANIES (2016),
https://ecgi.global/code/italian-stewardship-principles-2016 [hereinafter
ITALIAN STEWARDSHIP PRINCIPLES 2016].
62
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in which they invest,” thereby indirectly impacting listed companies
“which are called upon to promote dialogue with investors, asset
managers and their respective advisors,” as well as institutional
investors “that entrust the management of their assets to third
parties, and are requested to share with their managers certain
decisions on how to interact with the investee companies.” 64
As will be shown, by leveraging enhanced shareholder rights
and further shareholder-friendly regulatory measures, 65
Assogestioni has greatly contributed to shaping the practice of
institutional investor engagement in Italy. In particular, the enabling
and coordinating role performed by the Association actually
underpins the rise of effective forms of collective engagement by
mainstream, non-activist institutions,66 thus providing an alternative
to hedge fund-driven activist intervention, which has become quite
popular in Italy in spite of the still predominant ownership
concentration of publicly listed corporations.67

III. STIMULATING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR VOTING
AND ENGAGEMENT IN ITALY

In and of itself, the surge of institutional ownership is not
enough to stimulate institutional investors to take on a more active
corporate governance role. The Italian case clearly shows that
regulatory factors also contributed to supporting the increase in
institutional shareholder voting and engagement at publicly listed
companies. Over the last two decades, Italy gradually reshaped the
legal framework for participating in shareholders meetings and
voting so as to craft an engagement-friendly regulatory
environment.68 In fact, “a number of self-enforcing rules (especially

64

Id. at 11.
See infra Part III.A-C.
66
See infra Part III.D. and Part IV.A. See Gaia Balp & Giovanni
Strampelli, Institutional Investor Collective Engagements: Non-Activist
Cooperation vs Activist Wolf Packs, in 14 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J.
(forthcoming).
67
See infra Part V.
68
See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 7.
65
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on voting) and a broader set of minority shareholder rights have
made today’s Italian legal environment no less friendly to activist
investors than most other jurisdictions.”69 Enhanced shareholder
rights and asset managers’ quasi-duty to vote as a part of their
fiduciary duties to end-investors can be regarded as parallel forces
driving increased voting in spite of non-activist, traditional
institutions’ weak incentive structures.
Soft regulation in the form of corporate governance and
stewardship principles also contributed support to institutions’ more
active ownership. In effect, “provisions strengthening shareholders’
rights operate in conjunction with those set by stewardship and
corporate governance codes that target institutional investors as
shareholders in order to foster their constructive engagement with
investee companies as a part of institutions’ investment management
activities.”70

A. ASSET MANAGERS’ QUASI-DUTY TO VOTE AND

INSTITUTIONS’ ENGAGEMENT POLICY
When analyzing the EU regulatory environment as a supportive
factor for shareholder voting, one relevant issue to consider is that,
based on the framework for discretionary portfolio and collective
investment management, intermediaries are entitled to vote on
behalf of the shares owned by the funds they manage. Because of
this entitlement, according to Article 21 of Directive 2010/43/EU
and Article 37 of the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No.
231/2013, mutual funds and alternative investment funds are
required to set up a voting policy determining when and how to
exercise voting rights, whereas voting determinations are to be made

69

Id.
Gaia Balp, The Corporate Governance Role of Retail Investors, 31
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 47, 59-60 (2019).
70
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to the exclusive benefit of the funds and the investors in the funds.71
Voting is thus conceived of as a duty that intermediaries owe to endinvestors wherever―based on a cost-benefit analysis―it is in the
best interest of the beneficial owners of the shares. The end-investor
best-interest standard overarching the entire regulation of
investment intermediaries does not, in itself, entail a duty to vote
every share.72 However, investment managers are clearly not
allowed to simply remain passive and choose not to vote because,
depending on the investment strategies adopted, voting passivity can
be at odds with institutions’ duty to manage investments in the best
interest of their clients.73 Regulation thus provides an incentive
structure which, “rel[ying] on the presumption that shareholder
voting preserves, or even increases, the long-term value of the

71

Commission Directive 2010/43/EU of 1 July 2010 implementing
Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as
regards organisational requirements, conflicts of interest, conduct of
business, risk management and content of the agreement between a
depositary and a management company, 2010 O.J. (L 176) 42, 53-54
[hereinafter Commission Directive 2010/43/EU]; Commission Delegated
Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 Dec. 2012 supplementing Directive
2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to
exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, leverage,
transparency and supervision, 2013 O.J. (L 83) 1, 31.
72
See Commission Directive 2010/43/EU, supra note 71, at 44
(explicitly considering that “[a]s the case may be, the decision not to
exercise voting rights could be considered in certain circumstances as
being to the exclusive benefit of the UCITS depending upon its investment
strategy. However, the possibility for an investment company to vote itself
or to give specific voting instructions to its management company should
not be excluded.”).
73
See Christian Strenger & Dirk A. Zetzsche, Corporate
Governance, Cross-Border Voting and the (Draft) Principles of the
European Securities Law Legislation—Enhancing Investor Engagement
Through Standardisation, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 503, 515-17 (2013).
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investment,” eventually translates into some kind of “implicit duty
to vote.”74
In keeping with the EU provisions, Article 35-decies 1(e) of the
Italian CLF states that asset management companies “must provide,
in the investors' interests, for the exercise of the voting rights
associated with the financial instruments of the collective
investment schemes managed unless required otherwise by law.”75
Despite the wording used within the legislation (“must provide”),
the prevailing view is that Article 35-decies CLF does not establish
an obligation for asset management companies to exercise their
voting rights under all circumstances.76 In keeping with their
general duty to “operate diligently, correctly, and with transparency
in the best interests of the collective investment schemes managed,
the relevant investors and the integrity of the market,” as set by
Article 35-decies 1(a) CLF, asset management companies are

74
Id. at 515; see also Marco Maugeri, Proxy advisors, esercizio del
voto e doveri “fiduciari” del gestore [Proxy advisors, voting rights and
asset managers’ fiduciary duties], PROFILI EVOLUTIVI DELLA DISCIPLINA
SULLA GESTIONE COLLETTIVA DEL RISPARMIO 667, 680-682 (Roberta
D’Apice ed., 2016) (It.) (further explaining that requirements to adopt
voting strategies are organizational in nature and impose upon recipient
investment services providers a duty concerning their internal set-ups in
terms of the procedures to be applied. Hence, if exercising voting rights is
conceived of as a standard of conduct, then it is in the interest of endinvestors, not in that of investee companies).
75
Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB),
Legislative Decree No. 58 of 24 Feb. 1999,
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/fr_decree58_1998.htm?hkeywords=&
docid=0&page=0&hits=21&nav=false [hereinafter CONSOB].
76
See Renzo Costi, Risparmio gestito e governo societario [Asset
management and corporate governance], in GIURISPRUDENZA
COMMERCIALE 313, 322 (1988) (It.); see also Renzo Costi & Luca
Enriques, Il mercato mobiliare [The Financial Market], 8 TRATTATO DI
DIRITTO COMMERCIALE, 420 (Gastone Cottino ed., 2004) (It.).
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expected to vote only when it is in the interest of the ultimate
beneficiaries of the funds managed.77
In addition, Article 124-quinquies CLF—implementing
Articles 3g and 3f SRD II—requires institutional investors and asset
managers, if only based on a comply-or-explain approach, to adopt
an engagement policy that, inter alia, illustrates how they exercise
voting rights and other shareholder rights.78
In addition,
institutional investors and asset managers are required to publicly
disclose each year how their engagement policy has been
implemented and provide a general description of their voting
behavior, an explanation of the most significant votes, and the use
they made of proxy advisory services.79 Although it remains
questionable whether the newly added rules for institutional
investors and asset managers may actually contribute to increasing
the quality of investors’ engagement with investee companies, the
requirement that institutions disseminate information regarding
their engagement and actual voting conduct, and the reasons thereof,
indirectly adds to pressure on exercising voting rights. 80

77
Mario Stella Richter Jr., L’esercizio del voto con gli strumenti
finanziari gestiti [Asset managers’ voting], in I CONTRATTI DEL MERCATO
FINANZIARIO 791, 800 (Enrico Gabrielli & Raffaele Lener eds., 2nd ed.
2010) (It.).
78
CONSOB, supra note 75.
79
Id.
80
In particular, investors with less commitment towards shareholder
engagement could take on a formalistic stance in complying with Article
3f and further promote over-reliance on advisory services. In addition,
“disclosure of engagement dialogue may undermine its essential deftness,
fluidity, and focus on achieving a ‘win-win’ outcome for both parties.
Public disclosure may fundamentally change the type and frequency of
engagement and more robust and adversarial-type interactions may
result,” thereby “undermining the success of informal private engagement
by institutional investors.” Deirdre Ahern, The Mythical Value of Voice
and Stewardship in the EU Directive on Long-term Shareholder
Engagement: Rights Do Not an Engaged Shareholder Make, 20
CAMBRIDGE YEARBOOK OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 88, 106 (2018).
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B. PARTICIPATION IN THE SHAREHOLDER MEETING:

INFORMATION AND DUTY TO CALL
Reforms enacted in 2010 to transpose the SRD I into Italian
law81 contributed to shifting the making of voting decisions prior to,
and outside of, the shareholders meeting and to promoting better
shareholder information and the efficiency in the mechanics of
shareholders meetings, thereby contributing to the smoothening of
any disincentives institutional investors may have previously
encountered in participating in the meetings.
One clear example of such pro-shareholder regulatory efforts
may be drawn from Article 125-bis (4) CLF concerning the contents
of the notice of call to shareholders meetings. Article 125-bis (4)
CLF requires that the notice include, among further items, “a clear,
precise description” of the procedures to be applied in order to attend
and vote at the shareholders meeting and to exercise further
shareholder rights, such as the right to ask questions ahead of the
meeting or to prompt the board of directors to take action (typically
by requiring that additional items be put on the agenda or by
submitting further proposals on items already on the agenda).82
Article 125-bis (4) CLF can be viewed as the summary of a
wider set of provisions all emphasizing the active role investors are
expected to play in regard of the shareholders meeting. First,
acknowledging that being active owners requires adequate and
timely information, Article 125-ter CLF requires that the board of
directors make a report on each item on the agenda available by a
specified deadline significantly ahead of an upcoming shareholder
meeting, thereby obliging institutions’ needs to organize and
prepare for appropriate voting determinations and by limiting the
chilling effect associated with the delivery of relevant company
information much too close to the date of the meeting.83 In effect,
prior to the introduction of the record date system into national

81

SRD I was transposed into Italian law by Legislative Decree No.
27/2010.
82
CONSOB, supra note 75.
83
Id.
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law,84 inadequate timings for information delivery had proven to
adversely affect participation in the meeting and voting.85
Second, a shareholder-friendly, efficiency-promoting intent
clearly underpins Article 127-ter (1) CLF, which grants any
shareholder the right to submit questions on the items on the agenda
prior to the shareholders meeting and to receive the relevant answers
“at the latest” during the meeting.86
Finally, active ownership is further incentivized by the right
granted to shareholders who hold a specified minimum shareholding
threshold—usually institutional investors87—to directly activate the
shareholders meeting.
First, shareholders holding—either
individually or collectively—at least 5% of the share capital have
the right to call a general meeting.88 In addition, shareholders
holding—either individually or collectively—at least 2.5% of the

84

See infra Part III.C.5.
See Fabio Bianconi, L’attivismo delle minoranze in Italia: un
commento [Minority Shareholder Activism: A Comment], in FTSE MIB
Proxy Season 2010 70-71 (2011),
http://www.proxitalia.com/dld/files/Downloads/Pubblicazioni/FTSE%20
MIB%202010%20-%20Georgeson.pdf (It.) (finding a negative correlation
to exist between the delayed delivery of the board’s report (less than 20
days ahead of the meeting), institutional investors’ attendance to the
meeting, and the level of consensus to the board’s voting proposals). Still
another relevant disincentive for foreign institutions’ participation is the
unavailability of the board’s reports in English: see Valentina Allotti &
Paolo Spatola, Le assemblee delle società quotate: il d.lgs. n. 27 del 27
gennaio 2010, le prime esperienze applicative nel 2011 e il decreto
correttivo del 2012 [Listed Companies and Shareholder Meetings in Italy]
(Note e Studi Assonime 14/2012) 21 (2012), https://www.eticanews.it/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/Assonime.pdf (It.) (according to which over 70%
of respondent companies only deliver the notice of call to shareholder
meetings also in English); referred to the EU context, see also Chris
Mallin, Institutional Investors: The Vote as a Tool of Governance 16 J.
MANAG. GOV., 177, 194 (2012).
86
See Pederzini Elisabetta, Commento all’articoolo 127-ter
[Comment on Article 127-ter], COMMENTARY ON THE CONSOLIDATED LAW
ON FINANCE, 995-998 (Vincenzo Calandra Buonaura ed., 2020) (It.).
87
Stella Richter, supra note 77, at 800.
88
See CODICE CIVILE [CIVIL CODE], art. 2367 (It.).
85
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share capital may ask for additional matters to be put on the agenda
of the general meeting and may table new proposed resolutions for
a vote.89 Making voting proposals can serve not only to oppose the
board and controlling stockholders but also to remedy the much
criticized board-friendly practice of bundling together two or more
issues into the same item on the agenda in such a way as to prevent
these issues to be voted on separately. Noticeably, bundling—most
typically concerning the approval of the financial statements and
dividend distributions, the approval of a set of changes to the articles
of association, or director elections and compensation—has been
targeted in Italy also by proxy advisors for being in contrast to best
practice and inhibiting voting by proxy.

C. REGULATORY INCENTIVES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE

SHAREHOLDER MEETING
Beyond enhancing shareholder information rights, both passive
and active, and providing shareholders with the power to proactively
initiate the calling of a shareholders meeting and make voting
proposals, regulatory action taken ahead and in the wake of SRD I
was intended to also provide a set of tools incentivizing active and
long-term ownership. These tools range from additional voting
rights or dividends, conceived of as a reward for shareholder loyalty,
to multiple voting rights, in such a way simplified proxy voting and
proxy solicitation, say-on-pay votes, and the enhanced role to be
played by the shareholders in the context of related party
transactions. While not all of these tools have proven successful in
accomplishing the policy goal set and actually driving increased
shareholder engagement with Italian investee companies, some
indeed have, as is most notably the case for say-on-pay votes,
alongside the record date regime as regards attendance at the
shareholder meeting and the slate voting system as regards director
elections.

89
See Article 126-bis CLF. Both the right to call a special meeting
and to put items on the agenda cannot be exercised for items in relation to
which, under Italian law, shareholders may be called to resolve on draft
resolutions that have to be submitted or drafted by directors.
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1. The Limited Relevance of Loyalty-Based Dividend

and Vote Rewards for Supporting Institutional
Shareholder Engagement
With the explicit aim of encouraging longer-term investments,
two mechanisms were introduced in 2010 and 2014 to reward
shareholder loyalty in terms of cash flow rights or control rights. On
the one hand, Article 127-quarter CLF allows for a dividendincreasing mechanism to be adopted in the articles of association by
which “each share held by the same shareholder for a continuous
period of time indicated in the articles, in any case of no less than
one year or the lesser period running between two consecutive
payment dates of the annual dividend, shall assign the right to an
increase of no more than 10% of the dividend distributed to the other
shares.” Significantly, additional dividends may not be granted to,
de jure or de facto, controlling stockholders, whether individually or
jointly in control, nor to any shareholder wielding a significant
influence on the company or taking part in a shareholder agreement
accounting for more than the shareholding thresholds relevant to the
rules on the mandatory bid laid down in Article 106 CLF.
Therefore, quite evidently, the investor category especially targeted
by the dividend-increasing incentive is that of mainstream
institutional investors, which typically do not seek to gain control
over the company, who are unwilling to take part in shareholder
agreements due to the chilling effect associated with the rules on
concerted action and the triggering of mandatory bids, and whose
holdings, unlike those of some activist hedge funds, usually do not
allow them to individually exert any significant influence over the
company. It is thus traditional institutions, such as pension and
mutual funds, whether actively managed or passive, that are
candidates to possibly be rewarded for loyalty.
On the other hand, Article 127-quinquies CLF allows for loyal
shareholders to enjoy additional, time-phased voting rights—up to
two votes depending on the arrangements made in the articles of
association—for each share uninterruptedly held by them for no less
than two years, with additional voting rights expiring upon the sale
of the shares. Tenured voting may be adopted by any listed
company as an incentivizing tool, provided, however, that no
multiple voting structure is in place. Hence, additional voting rights
and multiple voting may only be alternative. Noticeably, multiple
voting structures—up to three votes per share—are allowed under
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Italian law since 2014 when they were introduced with the aim of
inducing family-owned firms (which make up the core of business
organizations in Italy) to list more shares on the stock market
without necessarily losing control and thus rendering Italian
companies less reliant on bank lending.90 Shares with multiple
voting rights can be issued by private companies only; companies
that issued such shares prior to listing are, however, allowed to
maintain such shares but prevented, if they so choose, from issuing
new such shares and from adopting additional, time-phased voting
rights. At the same time, eliminating the ban on multiple voting
rights, which had characterized corporate voting in Italy ever since
the enactment of the Civil Code in 1942, was also the reaction to the
migration of some leading Italian companies from Italy to the
Netherlands.91
Private ordering showed little interest in dividend-increasing
mechanisms, whether due to the many practical problems associated
with the implementation of the relevant provisions or simply
because, arguably, the long-term related financial incentive
provided by heightened dividends cannot outweigh short-term
opportunities associated with trading stocks.92
To the contrary, time-phased voting has proven to be more
successful if it is considered that 51 out of 231 companies listed on
the Italian exchange had adopted tenured voting.93 Importantly,
however, given that time-phased voting requires the articles of

90

See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 34-35.
See, e.g., Marco Ventoruzzo, The Disappearing Taboo of Multiple
Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat 1
(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 288/2015, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2574236.
92
See generally Mario Stella Richter Jr., I troppi problemi del
dividendo maggiorato [The Too Many Problems of Increased Dividends],
117 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 89 (2011) (It.).
93
See OECD, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 35. See
also Chiara Mosca, Should Shareholders Be Rewarded for Loyalty?
European Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured Voting and
Takeover Law, 8 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 245, 246
(2019).
91
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association to be amended, and that in order to enjoy the loyalty
reward a shareholder is required to file a request with the company,
the findings that adopters are almost exclusively family-owned
controlled firms and that registrant shareholders are almost
exclusively controllers, especially de jure controllers, are quite
deceiving from the standpoint of the achievement of the policy goal
to incentivize institutional shareholder long-term engagement, if not
unsurprising.94 Altogether, the clear dominance of controlling
shareholders in the ownership of companies adopting time-phased
voting seems to contradict the reasoning according to which tenured
voting encourages longer-term investments by investors other than
controlling shareholders. Quite to the opposite, the practice of timephased voting in Italy questions the effectiveness of such
mechanism as a means for retaining shareholders over the long term
or, at any rate, as a tool for encouraging institutional investor
engagement with investee companies. In a context of high levels of
ownership concentration, tenured voting rather appears to further
empower pre-existing long-term shareholders. In effect, since
controllers did not reduce their stake despite enjoying additional
voting rights, the overall net effect of time-phased voting actually
allowed those who were already in control to gain control over the
extraordinary shareholders meeting as well, where a two-thirds
majority of the share capital represented at the meeting is required
for making any decision.95 Similarly, the fundamental lack of
institutional investors and asset managers among the beneficiaries
of time-phased voting supports the view that time-phased voting
seems not, in and of itself, to subsidize institutional shareholder
engagement.96

94
Emanuele Bajo et al., Bolstering Family Control: Evidence from
Loyalty Shares (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. 25 (ECGI, Finance Working
Paper No. 619/2019, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3428887.
95
See Mosca, supra note 93, at 271.
96
See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners?
Corporate Governance Consequences of Active Investing, 55 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 803, 843 (2018) (highlighting that tenure voting and loyalty
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2. Proxy Voting and Remote Voting
As mentioned above, one aim of the SRD was to remove some
procedural hurdles which could have inhibited shareholder
participation in the shareholders meeting. Along the same lines,
Italian rules on proxy voting and proxy solicitation were simplified
in 2010 so as to render them less restrictive than they previously
were. Changes were also made to the rules on voting by
correspondence and electronic means.
Removing unnecessary restrictions to proxy voting is a tool for
facilitating shareholder participation. Additionally, other tools that
allow cost-effective participation at a distance and in absentia or
voting in advance of the meeting, such as electronic real-time
transmission of the meeting, real-time two-way communication
enabling shareholders to address the meeting from a remote
location, electronic voting, and voting by correspondence.
However, in regards to voting at a distance or in absentia, practical
experience in Italy casts doubts on the efficacy of the measures
adopted to achieve the policy goal set.
Under Article 2370 (4) Civil Code and Article 127 CLF, voting
at a distance is allowed both by correspondence and by remote.
Unlike voting by correspondence, voting by remote theoretically
allows for direct and potentially interactive participation in the
meeting. However, electronic and online voting are not mandatory
under Italian law, but neither is voting by correspondence. It rests
with the issuers to determine whether or not to adopt any of these

dividends, cannot alter the conduct of institutional investors and,
especially of the so-called passive index fund managers “[b]ecause passive
investors as permanent shareholders cannot sell shares included in the
reference index, they commit to the long term—irrespective of the level of
their voting rights—and may forego loyalty benefits simply because of
portfolio rebalancing”).
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enabling tools.97 Thus, despite the alternative-design approach
adopted at the regulatory level, enhanced shareholder empowerment
relies primarily on the arrangements that individual companies may
take in this respect, and a shareholder willing to vote her shares
without appointing a proxy agent will, or will not, be enabled to do
so remotely or in advance of the meeting depending on whether her
investee company actually offers her (one or more of) those tools.
As a matter of fact, in Italy voting by correspondence has remained
virtually ignored.98 Similarly, Italian-listed companies do not
necessarily offer investors the opportunity to participate in the
meeting and vote the shares at a distance via electronic means,
possibly to account for cost considerations concerning the relevant
technology. At any rate, it is unclear whether large institutional
investors, who routinely employ proxy advisors to help them make
voting determinations, would really refrain from voting the shares
only because of the need, absent electronic voting, to appoint a local
proxy agent.99 This state of affairs helps explain why appointing a

97

Interestingly, out of the 28 countries in the European Economic
Area that responded to a query by the European Securities and Markets
Authority, only Hungary and Iceland reported that they had mandated
provision of electronic means to enable shareholders attend the meeting,
including for voting. See EUR. SEC'S MKT. AUTH., REPORT ON
SHAREHOLDER IDENTIFICATION AND COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, 28-29
(ESMA 31-54-435) (Apr. 5, 2017). Detail implementing provisions for
voting by correspondence and voting via electronic means are set by
Articles 140 to 143-ter Consob Regulation no. 11971.
98
See Carlo Bellavite Pellegrini, Corporate Governance e assemblea
delle società quotate in Italia: un’indagine empirica [An empirical inquiry
into corporate governance and the shareholders meeting at corporations
publicly listed in Italy], 51 RIVISTA DELLE SOCIETÀ 416 (2006) (It.). The
changes made to Article 127 CLF in the SRD I transposition process were
minor in nature and did not change the substance of voting by
correspondence in any meaningful way.
99
See Marco Cian, Intervento e voto in assemblea: le nuove
tecnologie come mezzo per promuovere l’attivismo degli investitori
istituzionali? [Participating and voting in the shareholders meeting: new
technologies as a tool to promote institutional investor activism?], in
GOVERNO DELLE SOCIETÀ QUOTATE E ATTIVISMO DEGLI INVESTITORI
ISTITUZIONALI (Corporate governance and institutional investor activism)
104 (Marco Maugeri ed., 2015).
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proxy agent remains the voting tool most used by institutional
shareholders.100 Voting by proxy is possible under Italian law in
different ways, either according to the regime set by Article 2372
Civil Code, or that provided for by Articles 135-novies to 135undecies CLF for publicly listed corporations, which underwent
major simplification over time.
On the other hand, proxy fights based on the proxy solicitation
regime set by Articles 136 to 138 CLF remain episodic in the Italian
context despite the changes made in 2010 to the relevant rules. The
changes aimed to remove the many substantive limitations which,
alongside high costs, had previously prevented proxy solicitations
from ever growing into a workable pathway for active share
ownership. A shareholder willing to solicit proxies is no longer
under the obligation to enlist an intermediary to carry out the
process, as she was before the 2010 changes. In addition, a soliciting
shareholder is no longer required to meet certain requirements in
terms of minimum shareholding thresholds, nor to solicit proxies
from all of its fellow shareholders. In its current version, Article
136 (1)(b) CLF allows for a soliciting party to address a minimum
of 200 shareholders, hence allowing the soliciting party to
selectively address its fellow shareholders.101 Alongside the
possibility to disseminate proxy materials (a proxy statement and a
proxy form) via a website chosen by the soliciting person, which
may also be the issuer's site if the issuer so agrees,102 such measures

100

It remains to be seen whether implementation of Articles 3a and
3b of SRD II concerning shareholder identification and the transmission of
information along the investment chain, by allowing companies to
improve communication with their shareholder base and facilitating the
exercise of shareholder rights, will also encourage issuers’ voluntary
adoption of electronic means for participating in the voting process as a
tool by which to support shareholder engagement.
101
Under Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 136 (1)(b)
CLF, proxy solicitation is defined as “a request to more than two hundred
shareholders for proxy to be conferred in relation to specific voting
proposals, or accompanied by recommendations, statements or other
indications capable of influencing the vote”.
102
See Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 136 (3) of
Consob Regulation No. 11971.
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contributed to reducing the costs associated with the process, to be
borne by the soliciting party, thus theoretically enabling a
shareholder to more cost-effectively strengthen its voting power in
regard to specific voting proposals by soliciting proxies from likeminded fellow shareholders. Moreover, one-way proxies are no
longer mandatory for any soliciting shareholder as they previously
were.
Enabling two-way proxies, which, importantly, are
mandatory where the soliciting person is the issuer itself,103 reduces
the chilling effect associated with one-way proxies for solicited
shareholders actually wishing to vote by proxy, but to do so in a way
other than that proposed by the soliciting party. Lower costs and
greater flexibility seem to have revitalized proxy solicitation as a
lever for active share ownership, at least to some extent. Although
soliciting proxies is still not commonplace in Italy, probably as a
consequence of concentrated ownership with major stakeholders
able to control the voting outcomes at shareholders meetings, it has
become increasingly frequent, at least under specific circumstances
concerning the issuer.104

3. Say-on-Pay Votes on the Remuneration Policy and

Director Compensation Transparency
In order to empower shareholders, the Italian legislature
broadened the list of the issues falling within the remit of the general
meeting over time.105 For example, defensive measures against

103

See Italian Consolidated Law on Finance, Article 138 (2) of
Consob Regulation No. 11971.
104
One proxy fight that became famous for being “Italy’s fiercest
proxy contest in decades” occurred in 2012 when a shareholders meeting
was called by Salini at Impregilo to remove the Gavio group-dominated
board; the context in which the case occurred was a peculiar one, since it
was characterized by both hedge fund activism targeting Salini and an
unstable ownership structure as a consequence of shareholder coalitions
dominating the company with stakes less than 30% of the share capital.
See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 26-27. See also Proxitalia,
http://www.proxitalia.com/Page.asp/id=404/operazioni-concluse,

accessed February 12, 2020 (providing an illustrative list of proxy
fights managed at Italian listed companies).
105
Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 7-8.

EMPOWERING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP CONTEXTS:
THE CASE OF ITALY

2020

35

hostile takeovers, unless the company has opted out of the so-called
board neutrality rule, need to be authorized by the shareholders
meeting. Similarly, the requirement that any amendments to the
articles of association be approved by a supermajority of two-thirds
of the share capital represented at the meeting is clearly aimed at
incentivizing attendance by minority shareholders.
Further still, after introducing a precatory say-on-pay vote in
regard of the company’s remuneration policy in 2012, the current
version of Article 123-ter CLF—as amended by Legislative Decree
no. 49 of 10 May 2019 implementing Article 9a SRD II—has made
say-on-pay votes binding. The company must hold Say-on-pay at
least every three years, or whenever the board proposes any changes
to the remuneration policy last approved by the shareholders.
Hence, companies “shall only allocate fees in compliance with the
remuneration policy most recently approved by the shareholders.” 106
As an explanation for rendering say-on-pay binding in nature, the
draft explanatory report to Legislative Decree no. 49/2019
emphasizes the need to align the provisions on the remuneration
policy of all listed companies to those that were already in force for
banks and insurance companies, which provide for a binding sayon-pay votes.107 In addition, the scope of application of binding sayon-pay votes on the remuneration policy was broadened to also
include compensation to the members of the board of statutory
auditors, alongside that regarding the members of the board of
directors, general managers and executives with strategic
responsibilities (see Article 123-ter (3)(a) CLF).

106

See CONSOB, Article 123-ter (3-bis) CLF.
See Draft Explanatory Report to Legislative Decree, no. 49/2019
(February 8, 2019), 7 (in Italian only),
http://documenti.camera.it/apps/nuovosito/attigoverno/Schedalavori/getTe
sto.ashx?file=0071_F001.pdf&leg=XVIII#pagemode=none. See also
BANK OF ITALY, Circular no. 285/2013, Part I, Title IV, Chapter 2, Sec II,
para 1 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/normativa/archivionorme/circolari/c285/aggiornamenti/Testo-int-30-agg.pdf (It.) (providing
that remuneration policies for corporate boards be approved by the
shareholders meeting by a binding vote).
107
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As a tool for enhanced director accountability, say-on-pay votes
are meant to strengthen institutional investor monitoring.108 First,
from the standpoint of shareholder oversight, significant levels of
against and withhold say-on-pay votes quite clearly shows that a
portion of the shareholders withdrew support from the board, and
their dissent is made public.109 Second, say-on-pay votes can be
regarded as being functionally complimentary to the rights granted
to shareholders under the slate voting system for director
elections,110 to obtain that at least one director be elected by
minorities. If it is considered that minority-elected directors are
very often elected to the remuneration committee within the board,
the combined potential effect of say-on-pay votes and slate voting
can provide minorities with a form of intra-board monitoring over
the determinations concerning board compensation that may favor
alignment with international best practices (first and foremost in
regard to enhanced transparency), thus further encouraging
shareholder engagement.111 Interestingly, following the first
implementation of precatory say-on-pay, a positive correlation has
been found to exist between the presence of minority-elected
directors within the remuneration committee and increased
institutional investor participation in the shareholder meetings. 112
Moreover, low-quality information in the remuneration report has
been found to be positively correlated with higher levels of against
and withhold say-on-pay votes, suggesting that shareholders do
lever say-on-pay votes as a tool for corporate stewardship. 113 The

108
See, e.g., Commission Recommendation (EC) No. 385/2009,
recital 10, according to which “to increase accountability, shareholders
should be encouraged to attend general meetings and make considered use
of their voting rights. In particular, institutional shareholders should take a
leading role in the context of ensuring increased accountability of boards
with regard to remuneration issues”, https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0028:0031:
EN:PDF.
109
See infra Parts III.D.1 and IV.
110
See infra Parts III.D.1 and IV.
111
See infra Part IV.
112
See infra Part IV.
113
See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
20, 25-26.
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significance of say-on-pay votes on the remuneration policy is, in
fact, further heightened by the fact that the fees actually paid to
directors, general managers, executives with strategic
responsibilities, and members of the board of statutory auditors
during the financial year need to be submitted to a shareholders’
vote, if still non-binding.114 Moreover, the board of directors is
required to illustrate yearly how the company has taken account of
the vote cast the previous year on the fees paid.115

4. Related Party Transactions and Shareholder

Oversight
The rulings on related party transactions are among the most
significant rulings intended to reduce principal-principal agency
costs associated with controllers’ potential for self-dealing,116 which
was first introduced in Italy as early as 2010 to be only slightly
amended in 2019 in the process of transposing Article 9 (c) SRD II
into national law. The general provisions on related party
transactions are drawn in Articles 2391-bis of the Civil Code, which
vests Consob with the authority to lay down rules aimed at ensuring
that related party transactions are transparent, are illustrated in the
board’s annual report to the financial statements and comply with
procedural and substantive fairness requirements, and Article 154ter (4) CLF, which requires the board’s interim report to half-yearly
financial statements to also include information on significant,
related party transactions.117 The contents of such information, as

114

See ArticleCLF [C.c.] art. 123-ter (6) (It.) (providing that the
shareholders meeting resolves in favor or against the section of the
remuneration report to be drawn by the board of directors illustrating, in a
clear and understandable manner, each of the items comprising
remuneration, as well as the fees paid during the financial year, and that
such resolution is not binding).
115
See CLF [C.c] art. 123-ter (4) (b-bis) (It.).
116
See generally Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy
Options and Real-World Challenges (With a Critique of the European
Commission Proposal), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 1 (2015).
117
See CIVIL CODE [C.c] art. 2391-bis (It.); CLF [C.c] art. 154-ter (4)
(It.).
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well as substantive regulation of related party transactions, are laid
down by Consob in Regulation no. 17221 of March 12, 2010, which
envisages safeguards aimed at protecting the company and its noncontrolling shareholders against potential value diversion or
misappropriation by controllers and further related parties, including
detailed provisions involving independent directors in the decisionmaking process and, in some cases, empowering dissenting
minorities to prevent the transaction. Regulation 17221 is currently
in the process of being updated following the SRD II.118 However,
if it is considered that such regulation will not undergo major
changes, its current version is still fully meaningful to provide an
overview of the general regime related party transactions are
subjected to in Italy.
First, Article 4 of Regulation no. 17221 requires that the board
of directors adopt a specified internal procedure to ensure
transparency as well as substantial and procedural fairness of related
party transactions.119 Second, Article 5 of the same regulation
requires that the company publicly disclose material transactions in
accordance with Article 114 (5) CLF120 and Article 17 of Regulation
(EU) no. 596/2014.
Further, according to Article 8 of Regulation no. 17221, the
board of directors may approve material, related party transactions
(transactions “of greater importance,” as identified through a set of

118
See Commissione nazionale per le società e la borsa (Consob),
Resolution No. 17221 (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/laws-andregulations/documenti/english/laws/reg17221e.htm?hkeywords=resolution
+17221&docid=9&page=0&hits=20&nav=false,
(regulations containing provisions relating to transactions with
related parties). Public consultation concerning the proposed amendments
to Regulation 17221/2010 was launched on October 31, 2010.
119
See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 4 (2010).
120
See CLF [C.c] art. 114 (5) (It.) (Providing that Consob may
require the issuers, the subjects which control them, board members,
managers and persons who hold major holdings or who are parties to a
shareholders’ agreement to publish the information and documents needed
to inform the public); Commission Regulation 596/2014, art. 17, 2014 J.O.
(L 173) 1 (EU).
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quantitative parameters) only if favorable advice has been
previously given by a committee of independent directors involved
in the negotiations; however, company-specific related party
procedures may stipulate that the board may approve the transaction
despite the negative opinion from the committee if and only if a
shareholders meeting is convened and a majority of unrelated
shareholders approve the transaction (the so-called ‘whitewash’).121
Instead, the board may approve transactions “of lesser importance”
notwithstanding the negative opinion of the committee, which, in
addition, is not required to lead the negotiations and is without
recourse to the shareholders meeting whitewash.122 According to
Annex 1 of Regulation no. 17221 (concerning definitions functional
to the definitions of related parties and related party transactions),
an entity is a related party to a company if, among others, the party
“controls the company, is controlled by, or is under common
control.”123
Once again, the interaction between the Italian regimes for
related party transactions and for director elections through the
mandatory slate voting system needs to be considered in order to
fully understand how such interaction can support active
shareholder monitoring and stewardship. In effect, since ex ante
independent scrutiny of related party transactions is required to
ensure that the transaction is fair for the company and all of its
shareholders, minority board representation ensured by slate voting
can also improve self-dealing oversight.
At Italian-listed
companies, the presence of minority-elected directors appointed by
institutional investors has had a positive impact on the adequacy of
internal procedures for addressing related party transactions. 124 In

121

See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 8, 2010,
See Consob Regulation No. 17221, art. 7, 2010.
123
See Consob Regulation No. 17221, annex 1, 2010 (emphasis
added).
124
See Marcello Bianchi et al., Regulation and Self-Regulation of
Related Party Transactions in Italy: An Empirical Analysis (Eur. Corp.
Governance Inst. 25 (ECGI, Finance Working Paper No. 415/2014, 2014),
122
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particular, “the presence of at least one minority director is indeed
associated with adoption of stricter internal codes, not only when
minority directors are members of the committee of independent
directors vetting internal codes, but also when they merely sit on the
board.”125 Indeed, the very reason why mandatory slate voting was
originally adopted in Italy for board elections at listed companies
was to secure minority board representation as a monitoring tool
deployed by active shareholders, in keeping with the view that
institutional investors should be encouraged to act as corporate
stewards.126 Further findings from the Italian context seem to
support the hypothesis that non-executive minority directors reduce
principal-principal agency costs associated with controllers’
potential self-dealing, and positively affect firm value, “even in
presence of factors (uncertainty about future financial results and
high information asymmetry) that might exacerbate the risk of holdup by minority shareholders.”127 Thus, “the benefits associated to
the active monitoring role by the independent minority directors
outweigh the costs of potential frictions within the board.”128

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383237. It should be
noticed that Regulation no. 17221 introduced both stricter procedural
requirements and heightened disclosure obligations, however leaving
some freedom to the board of directors in drawing the individual
company’s internal procedure for RPTs: the board is thus allowed to optup or opt-down from some of the provisions set forth in the regulation as
defaults.
125
Id. at 25 (also finding that, to the contrary, the degree of board
independence, as measured by the percentage of independent directors
sitting on the board, does not have an impact on the strictness of such
internal procedures).
126
See Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors'
Independence at Controlled Companies, 44 J. CORP. L. 103, 135-36
(2018). See also Marco Ventoruzzo, Empowering Shareholders in
Directors’ Elections: A Revolution in the Making, 8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L.
REV. 105, 141 (2011).
127
Nicola Moscariello et al., Independent Minority Directors and
Firm Value in a Principal–Principal Agency Setting: Evidence from Italy,
23 J. MGMT. AND GOV. 18–19 (2019).
128
Id.
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5. The Pivotal Impact of the Record Date System on

Boosting Institutional Investors’ Voting
Although they do significantly empower minority shareholders,
most of the regulatory measures illustrated above would still not
have provided institutional investors with an incentive strong
enough to subsidize increased participation in the shareholders
meeting had it not been for the mandatory adoption of the record
date regime to regulate attendance and voting in the meeting. In
fact, the blocking requirement imposed on the shares for up to two
days prior to the meeting, which was previously enshrined in Article
2370 Civil Code, amounted to a significant economic impediment
on institutional investor attendance, since it seriously restricted the
ability of investors to freely trade their shares for a not insignificant
number of days ahead of the meeting.129 Thus, the shift toward the
mandatory record date system (See Article 83-sexies CLF) has
greatly reduced the main economic disincentive associated with
participating in the meeting and has indeed proven to be crucial in
boosting institutional investor voting, especially with regards to
foreign institutions.130 As the evidence available quite clearly
shows, after introducing the record date regime in 2010, institutional
investors’ participation in the shareholders meetings has virtually
doubled at non-controlled Italian listed companies, and has
remarkably increased even at de jure controlled companies, in spite
of the fact that control over voting outcomes is still secured to the
controlling blockholders.131

129

See B. Espen Eckbo & Giulia Paone, Reforming Share-Voting
Systems: The Case of Italy 7-8 (Tuck School of Bus. Working Paper No.
2011-93), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1822287.
130
Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 21.
131
See Mario Notari, Diritti di voice degli azionisti e tutela delle
minoranze [Shareholders’ voice and protections of minority shareholders],
in IL TESTO UNICO DELLA FINANZA. UN BILANCIO DOPO 15 ANNI
[CONSOLIDATED LAW ON FINANCE AT 15] 247, 256-257. (Filippo
Annunziata ed., Egea 2015) (It.).
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D. SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT
As illustrated above,132 various actions have been taken in order
to support, facilitate and incentivize institutional investor
participation and voting at shareholders meetings. However, other
forms of engagement that usually take place outside the general
meeting exist which remain substantially unregulated, despite their
increasing relevance within the practice of engagement.133
Article 124-quinquies CLF (almost literally transposing Article
3g(1)(a) SRD II) now requires―if only on a comply or explain
basis―that institutional investors publish their engagement policy
yearly to illustrate, among other things, the ways in which “investors
monitor investee companies on important issues, including strategy,
financial and non-financial results as well as risks, capital structure,
social and environmental impact and corporate governance, interact
with
investee
companies,
. . . cooperate with other shareholders, and communicate with the
relevant stakeholders of the investee companies.”134 In line with the
principles set by virtually any stewardship code, whether national or
international, Article 124-quinquies CLF makes it clear that
engagement is more than just voting and includes “investment
decision-making, monitoring assets and service providers, engaging
with issuers and holding them to account on material issues,
collaborating with others, and exercising rights and
responsibilities.”135
The importance of shareholders’ engagement is clearly
recognized also by the Italian Corporate Governance Code 2020

132

See supra Part III.A-C.
See generally Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The
Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 J. Fin.
2905, 2911–16 (2016); Giovanni Strampelli, Knocking at the Boardroom
Door: A Transatlantic Overview of Director-Institutional Investor
Engagement in Law and Practice, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 187 (2018).
134 CONSOB, Article 124-quinquies CLF.
135
FIN. REP. COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2020 (Oct.
2019), 7, https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/5aae591d-d9d34cf4-814a-d14e156a1d87/Stewardship-Code_Dec-19-Final.pdf.
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EMPOWERING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP CONTEXTS:
THE CASE OF ITALY

2020

43

according to which “[t]he board of directors promotes dialogue with
shareholders and other stakeholders which are relevant for the
company, in the most appropriate way.”136 To that end, the Code
recommends “the board of directors adopts and describes in the
corporate governance report a policy for managing dialogue with the
generality of shareholders, taking into account the engagement
policies adopted by institutional investors and asset managers.” 137
Some engagements may best be conducted privately by a single
investor, and many take place behind closed doors. 138 However,
there are forms of public engagement which have proven quite
effective in the Italian context. In particular, Italian experience with
director elections through the slate voting system suggests
coordinated engagements by institutional investors can have a
positive impact on investee companies, especially with regard to
corporate governance issues. Closely following EFAMA, 139 the
Italian Stewardship Principles acknowledge that the collective one
“may be the most effective method of engagement.”140 Over the
years, Assogestioni has been increasingly taking on an active role in
providing operational support to its affiliates, 141 thus developing a
peculiar pathway for collective engagement and showing that
investor associations can play a proactive role within the framework
for stewardship, as they can catalyze investors’ stewardship efforts
by favoring the redistribution of the engagement costs among the

136

CORP. GOVERNANCE COMM., supra note 47, at 5.
Id., at 6.
138
See supra note 133. See also Elroy Dimson et al., Coordinated
Engagements 9 (July 1, 2020) (Working Paper) (on file with SSRN),
https://ssrn.com/id=3209072.
139
See EUR. FUND AND ASSET MANAG’NT. ASS’N, supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 4 (recommending that asset managers “should
consider acting with other investors, where appropriate.” Guidance to
Principle 4 further emphasizes that shareholder collaboration may
sometimes be “the most effective manner in which to engage.”).
140
Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 17-18.
141
See generally Strampelli, supra note 126, at 134-35.
137
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institutional investors that carry out engagement activities
collectively.142
Individual and collective engagements might further be
facilitated by the new rules on shareholder identification set by
Article 83-duodecies CLF, as amended following the SRD II.

1. Director (and Statutory Auditor) Elections

Through Slate Voting
The most distinctive feature of the Italian corporate governance
framework is the right to board representation that is granted to
minority shareholders through the slate voting system (voto di lista),
which is mandatory for corporate elections at all listed companies.
It proved to be crucial to empower institutional investors insofar as
minorities enjoy the right to elect at least one member of the board
of directors and one member of the board of statutory auditors.
Under slate voting, corporate boards are elected from competing
slates of nominees, which are usually submitted by sponsoring
shareholders. The majority of directors are elected from the slate
receiving the largest number of votes at the shareholders meeting
(so-called “majority slate”), but at least one director must be picked
from the slate that obtains the largest number of votes after the
majority slate (so-called “minority slate”)143 and that is not linked in

142
With the aim of favoring the sharing of engagement-related
benefits and costs among investors, costs are allocated in proportion of the
"size" of associated asset managers: see ASSOGESTIONI, Bylaws 34 (2016),
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,813,11301/statuto-marzo-2016.pdf
(stating that each member must pay a fee comprised of a fixed amount and
a variable amount, which is established by dividing the remaining portion
of the budget amongst all members in proportion with the assets collected
and/or managed at the end of the previous year). See also Balp &
Strampelli, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 45-48.
143 See Art. 147-ter (3) (1998) (under which “the member elected
from the minority slate must satisfy the integrity, experience and
independence requirements established pursuant to Articles 148(3) and
148(4). Failure to satisfy the requirements shall result in disqualification
from the position.”). See generally Guido Ferrarini et al., Corporate
Boards in Italy, in CORPORATE BOARDS IN LAW AND PRACTICE 367, 392–
393 (Paul Davies et al. eds., 2013).
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any way, either directly or indirectly, to the majority slate that won
the most votes.144 In particular, under Article 147-ter CLF,
shareholders holding a minimum threshold of shares—set by
Consob and currently varying between 0.5% and 4.5%145—are
entitled to present lists of candidates for election to the board of
directors. The same applies to elections to the board of statutory
auditors according to Article 148 CLF, under which the chair of the
board must be picked from the statutory auditors elected from the
minority slate. Mandatory slate voting was first introduced in 1998,
limited however to elections to the board of statutory auditors.146 In
2005, ensuing the financial scandal around Parmalat, slate voting
was extended to elections to the board of directors as well. 147
Minority shareholders willing to submit a slate of director
nominees and ready to bear the (non-negligible) costs associated are
thus offered a way of gaining access to the boardroom and having a
direct insight into the company’s affairs.
Arguably, cost
considerations are part of an explanation for the crucial role that
Assogestioni has been playing in the process of selecting director

144 Article 144 (6) of Consob Regulation no. 11971 clearly
states “[a] shareholder may not submit or vote for more than one
list, including through nominees or trust companies. Shareholders
belonging to the same group and shareholders participating in a
shareholder agreement involving the shares of the issuer may not
submit or vote for more than one list, including through nominees
or trust companies. A candidate may only be present in one list,
under penalty of ineligibility.” Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini et
al., Board Elections and Shareholder Activism: The Italian Experiment, in
BOARDS AND SHAREHOLDERS IN EUROPEAN LISTED COMPANIES: FACTS,
CONTEXT AND POST-CRISIS REFORMS 378–83 (Massimo Belcredi & Guido
Ferrarini eds., 2013). See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 8–9.
145 See 11971 Consob Regulation Art. 144-quater (1999). The
minimum threshold set by Consob varies depending on the company’s
capitalization. Shareholders are not, however, prevented from setting a
lower shareholding threshold in the articles of association.
146
147

See Belcredi & Ferrarini, et al., supra note 144, at 367.
Id.
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nominees and submitting minority slates ever since the introduction
of slate voting. If it is considered that, under the Italian Stewardship
Principles, “[t]he presentation of candidates for election as
independent minority members of boards of investee companies,
also through the [Assogestioni] Investment Managers’ Committee,
represents a continuous and constructive method of engaging with
investee companies,”148 submitting slates of director nominees has
indeed grown into an increasingly significant tool for exerting
investor active ownership.149 More so, slate voting, combined with
the proactive role played by Assogestioni as an enabling entity, has
proven to be a fundamental lever by which to support (non-activist)
institutional investors’ collective action as a viable and costeffective pathway for engaging investee companies.
Assogestioni does not promote shareholder collaboration
loosely, but indeed provides institutionalized support for collective
engagement by leveraging the national regulatory framework for
corporate elections at listed companies. Based on a formalized
procedure, candidates for election as minority representatives to
corporate boards are selected in accordance with the “principles for
the selection of candidates for corporate bodies of listed companies”
drawn up by the Assogestioni Corporate Governance Committee.150
The Investment Managers’ Committee is in charge of selecting
candidates with the assistance of an independent advisor. The
independent advisor is charged with maintaining a database of
possible candidates and submitting to the Investment Managers’
Committee a short list of those that appear to best meet the

148

Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 17.
See infra Part IV.2.
150 Such committee is composed of members of Assogestioni’s
board and representatives of member companies. See Assogestioni,
PROTOCOL OF DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE AND THE INVESTMENT MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE
20–21 (2017) (such committee is composed of members of Assogestioni’s
board and representatives of member companies).
149

2020

EMPOWERING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP CONTEXTS:
THE CASE OF ITALY

47

requirements for each corporate office.151 Further still, candidates
must have adequate professionalism, integrity, and independence;152
to avoid possible conflicts of interest, legal representatives of
investment management companies and, unless at least one year has
elapsed since the relevant appointments were relinquished, anyone
who has served in a senior management or an executive role at an
investment management company may not be selected as a
candidate.153 In addition, to ensure that candidates be independent
vis-à-vis the company for which they are nominated, “[m]embers of
governing or supervisory bodies and senior managers of institutions
and companies that have significant business ties with the company
for which they are nominated may be selected as candidates
provided that at least one year has elapsed since the end of these
appointments.”154 If elected, candidates are required not to accept
any senior management position or corporate appointment at the
same company or at any other company belonging to the same
corporate group for at least one year after the end of their term,
unless they are nominated once again as candidates by the
Investment Managers’ Committee.155
Ever since its adoption, slate voting has been conceived of as a
lever to secure minority board representation and subsidize active

151 Id., at 24-26 (specifying that “[e]ven when minority slates are
presented for elections to boards, the Committee members undertake no
obligation in regard to the exercise of voting rights during general
meetings.”) The Investment Managers’ Committee is composed solely of
representatives of member investment management companies or other
Italian or foreign institutional investors, who communicate each time to
the Committee’s secretariat their interest in participating in the submission
of the individual slates for minority candidates’ election to the boards of
Italian investee listed issuers).
152
Id., at 26.
153 Id., at 28–29 (also stating that persons who hold a senior
management or executive role in investment management companies may
not be selected as candidates for company boards).
154
Id., at 29.
155
Id., at 30.
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shareholder monitoring.156 Noticeably however, chiefly on account
of the ownership structures of Italian listed companies, such systems
for board elections can sometimes lead to unexpected and, to some
extent, counterintuitive situations. Specifically, at so-called de facto
controlled companies, where controllers hold less than 50% of the
voting rights, institutional investors collectively may actually own
the majority of the votes or, at any rate, a proportion of the votes
larger than that of the controlling stockholders. 157 Hence, it is
increasingly the case—especially at larger corporations where de
facto controllers hold a relatively small stake—that the list
submitted by institutional investors under the coordination of
Assogestioni actually receives more votes than that submitted by (de
facto) controlling shareholders, and sometimes even an absolute
majority of the votes.158 If it is considered that, based on the
engagement strategy adopted by Assogestioni, affiliated institutions
only present so-called short lists of director nominees in order to
avoid taking control of the company by electing a majority of the
board,159 where minority-submitted lists receive the majority of the
votes cast, a majority of the shareholders ends up appointing a
minority of the directors, whilst a minority (as the de facto
controlling shareholder) appoints a majority. Paradoxical as it may
appear, such outcome is in line with the approach to investor

156

See Strampelli, supra note 126, at 135–36.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CAPITAL MARKET
REVIEW OF ITALY 2018: MAPPING REPORT 53-54 (2018)),
www.oecd.org/corporate/OECD-Capital-Market-Review-Italy-MappingReport-2018.pdf.
158
Mario Stella Jr. Richter & Federico Ferdinandi, The Evolving Role
of the Board: Board Nomination and the Management of Dissenting
Opinions, 4 ITALIAN L.J. 611, 613 (2018).
159
See Assogestioni, supra note 150, at 23. Interestingly, also hedge
funds most often take advantage of short-slate rules, since the submission
of a short slate can encourage them “to seek board representation with the
possible objective of putting the company up for sale, but without
themselves acquiring control. Because hedge funds are not typically
strategic bidders and traditionally did not want control (which carried
some risk of liability), this rule well served their needs”. See John C.
Coffee Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 560 (2016).
157
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stewardship adopted by the Italian Stewardship Principles,
according to which the appointment of some independent directors
only “serve[s] as a method of monitoring.”160 Consistent with such
approach, engagement promoted by Assogestioni is primarily aimed
at minimizing “the agency costs arising from the presence of a
controlling shareholder by sharing management decisions, and thus
by exercising closer monitoring,”161 and not—in contrast to the
usual approach of hedge funds—at influencing firms’ strategic and
financial decision-making, also by replacing management.162

160
Assogestioni, supra note 63, at 16; in fact, the regulatory
framework for acquisition of major holdings or control in European listed
companies applicable to traditional UCITS funds —but not to alternative
funds reserved to professional investors (AIFs, such as hedge funds)—
prevents mutual UCITS funds from acquiring or exercising control (or
significant influence) over investee companies in order to limit risk
concentration. See Simone Alvaro & Filippo Annunziata, Shareholdings of
Alternative Investment Funds in Listed Companies and in Banks: A Legal
Perspective, 14 (Consob Legal Research Paper No. 17, 2018),
http://www.consob.it/documents/46180/46181/lp17.pdf/2ca235bc-17a14bda-9efb-569d9ff361b8. This, in turn, helps explain why hedge funds
may submit long, or even full, slates of director nominees to a shareholder
vote. See also Coffee & Palia, supra note 159, at 560 (noting that “[t]he
goal of the short slate rule also was to encourage ‘constructive
engagement’ through minority board representation-without a
confrontational battle between activists and the issuer.”).
161 Matteo Erede, Governing Corporations with Concentrated
Ownership Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Hedge Fund Activism in
Italy and Germany, and Its Evolution, 10 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 328,
371 (2013). See also Belcredi & Ferrarini et al., supra note 144, at 414;
Luigi Zingales, Italy Leads in Protecting Minority Investors, FIN. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2008), https://www.ft.com/content/357c40c4-094d-11dd-81bf0000779fd2ac (considering that a vote for a minority list sponsored by
Assogestioni is not “a vote against the management but a vote to ensure
truly independent board members and avoid the representation of other
opportunistic minority shareholders, who might have other goals in
mind”).
162 Erede, supra note 161, at 370.
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2. Shareholder Identification as a Tool for favoring

Collective Shareholder Initiatives
With a view to promoting institutional investors’ active
ownership, Article 83-duodecies CLF, last amended in 2019 to
transpose SRD II, explicitly conceives of shareholder identification
as a means by which to “facilitate issuers’ communication with
shareholders as well as the exercise of shareholder rights, including
in a coordinated manner.”163
Issuers are entitled to require intermediaries along the
investment chain to identify the shareholders, however limited to
those holding more than 0.5% of the voting rights;164 the costs
associated with the process of identifying the shareholders are borne
by the issuer (see Article 83-duodecies (1)). Importantly, Article
83-duodecies (3) CLF imposes an obligation on the company to start
the identification process upon request of minority shareholders,
whereas the minimum threshold required for the shareholders to
make such request is the same set for submitting a slate of director
nominees under Article 147-ter CLF. Hence, the threshold
shareholders are required to meet to initiate the process varies
between 0.5% and 4.5% of the share capital depending on the size

163

See Article 83-duodecies (1) CLF (emphasis added).
Noticeably, under the previous version of Article 83-duodecies
CLF companies (or shareholders holding a certain stake) were allowed to
request shareholder identification only where such right was actually set
out in the articles of association; in turn, no restriction applied as regards
the shareholders to be identified, since the request was not restricted to
shareholders holding more than a certain percentage of shares or voting
rights. According to the draft explanatory report, setting the minimum
threshold to exercise the right to request the identification above 0.5% of
the share capital was needed in order to avoid that shareholder
identification be used as a defensive measure by directors or controlling
shareholders against smaller shareholders aiming at building up more
relevant stakes. It should be noticed, however, that setting such threshold
entails that companies will not be able, as a matter of fact, to (also)
identify their retail shareholder base, if they wished so. As a result, an
issuer’s interest in reaching out to its retail shareholders may diminish at
companies where the shareholder base includes a significant proportion of
retail investors.
164
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of the company and its ownership structure. Where the process is
started upon shareholder request, the costs are shared between the
issuer and the requesting shareholders based on criteria set by
Consob in such way as to oblige the need that shareholder requests
be in line with the aim of facilitating shareholder coordination.165 In
any case, data concerning shareholder identification are made
available to shareholders “on a commonly-used electronic storage
device free of charge,”166 irrespective of whether the process was
initiated by the issuers or the shareholders.
As is apparent, shareholder identification, alongside the rules
on top-down and bottom-up transmission of information relevant to
the exercise of shareholders’ rights along the investment chain (see
Article 83-novies (1)(g-bis), Article 82 (4-bis) CLF, and
implementing regulations), are clearly intended to support the
exercise of shareholder rights as a policy goal. Shareholder
identification encourages engagement between a company’s
investor relations department and its shareholders since it can
improve communication with the shareholder base and allows the
company to develop more targeted communication programs; the
right granted to minorities to activate the identification process adds
to shareholder active ownership since it favors non-activist
institutional investor collective action—whether through voting,
convening a general meeting, putting a new item on a meeting’s
agenda, asking questions, etc., or simply by facilitating sharing
views on agenda items, corporate action and governance, or gauging

165

See Article 133-bis of Consob regulation No. 11971 (providing
that cost allocation be regulated by each issuer in the articles of
association; if the articles of association fail to do so, the costs of
shareholder identification will be borne entirely by the issuer. However, if
the shareholders make a request for shareholder identification in the six
months following the end of the fiscal year, and in any case prior to the
annual general meeting, and no identification request is made directly by
the issuer in the same period of time, the company will fully incur the
costs for disclosure of the shareholder identification data and the number
of shares registered on the securities accounts).
166 See Article 83-duodecies (4) CLF.
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preferences, e.g. in view of an important and uncertain vote, and up
to challenging the board or controlling shareholders.

IV. THE PRACTICE OF SHAREHOLDER VOTING AND

ENGAGEMENT IN ITALY
This section briefly follows up on the analysis above by
reporting some evidence regarding the practice of shareholder
voting and engagement in Italy. We focus on say-on-pay and
director elections through slate voting since these tools have proven
to catalyze institutional investors’ preferences in the Italian context.

A. SAY-ON-PAY VOTES
Alongside enhanced attendance rates at shareholders
meetings,167 increased institutional investor engagement with
companies publicly listed in Italy can be quite clearly inferred from
data concerning say-on-pay votes ever since first-time application
of Article 123-ter (6) CLF in 2012, whose outcomes seem in line
with those characterizing other Member States: altogether, for-votes
prevail over against and withhold votes, with investors mostly
tending to side with directors.168 However, against votes are all but

167

See supra Part II.
See Georgeson et al., FTSE MIB Proxy Season 2013, 34-41
(2013), https://archivioceradi.luiss.it/files/2011/10/FTSE-MIB-2013Evoluzione-degli-assetti-proprietari-ed-attivismo-delle-minoranze.pdf,
according to whom for say-on-pay votes averaged 88% of the voting
capital in 2012 and 90% in 2013. See also Belcredi et al., supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 9, according to whom against and
withhold votes averaged 5% in 2012. Such divergent findings are arguably
attributable to the different width of sample issuers examined in the
analyses (limited to FTSE MIB issuers in the first case; including all 226
publicly listed companies in the second case). Hence, higher dissent levels
found in the first study emphasize that non-national institutions tend to
concentrate investments in blue chips. In both cases, consensus over
remuneration policies was found to be only slightly higher than that
observed in the United States and the UK, and in line with that found in
other countries with higher levels of ownership concentration, such as
Germany.
168
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irrelevant, more so if ownership concentration is considered. 169
Where major stakeholder votes are left aside, consensus over
remuneration at larger issuers averaged 57% of the votes in 2012
and 67% in 2013. Interestingly enough, against votes nonetheless
accounted for more than 50% in 10 out of 32 FTSE MIB companies
in 2013, chiefly as a consequence of foreign institutional investor
votes.170 In fact, over the first years of say-on-pay application,
increased attendance at shareholders meetings by foreign
institutions has been found to positively correlate with both the size
of investee firms and higher rates of against votes, with foreign
institutions also seeming to drive the votes of domestic
institutions.171 Hence, institutional investor scrutiny appears to be
stronger at larger firms.172 In turn, the fact that dissent over
remuneration policies negatively correlates with ownership
concentration is generally explained by closer monitoring
performed by controlling shareholders.173
Where against votes were found to be a majority, this occurred
under particular circumstances and within complex contexts,
typically in situations where the firm was facing financial distress,
suits were brought against corporate directors, or all directors
resigned in the context of control contests.174 Out of such
circumstances, higher dissent rates were typically found to be
associated with unsatisfactory information in the remuneration
policy proposed by the board, exceedingly generous compensation
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See Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 18-19.
See Georgeson et al., supra note 168168, at 35.
171
See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
28-29, 32 (according to whom non-national institutions perform a dissentaggregation function vis-à-vis domestic investors).
172
Id.at 25, 26, 28.
173
Id. at 27-28.
174
Id. at 22.
170
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levels, especially in regard to CEO severance contracts or
performance-based vesting conditions in equity grants.175
Against and withhold say-on-pay votes by institutional
investors have increased in 2018 to about 8% of the share capital
and 41% of the total number of shares held by them. 176
Interestingly, since 2017, dissent has grown markedly at Italian blue
chips, reversing the decreasing trend for FTSE MIB companies over
the 2012-2016 period.
Altogether, relative average say-on-pay consensus in Italy has
been interpreted not as a measure of institutional investors’
unawareness and conformity in opinions, but as a confirmation of
the efficacy of say-on-pay as a lever by which to promote higher
levels of transparency concerning remuneration policies, as well as
a signal for enhanced transparency177 achieved as a response to

175

See id. at 27; see also Georgeson et al., supra note 168, at 41
(stating that such findings are in line with those referred to the UK, where
non-binding say-on-pay was introduced in 2002); see Fabrizio Ferri &
David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence
from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527, 529 (2013) (indicating that these very
same reasons motivate negative voting recommendations issued by proxy
advisors as well); see, e.g., Frontis Governance, Studio sulle
remunerazioni nelle società quotate in Italia. Esercizio 2011 [A Study on
2011 Remunerations at Publicly Listed Companies in Italy] 29 (2012),
http://www.frontisgovernance.com.
176
Consob, supra note 42, at 35 (noticing that institutional investors’
dissent appears to be lower at widely held companies and when
institutional investors hold a major stake).
177
See Frontis Governance, Studio sulle remunerazioni nelle società
quotate in Italia. Esercizio 2012 [A Study on 2012 Remunerations at
Publicly Listed Companies in Italy] 6 (2013),
http://www.frontisgovernance.com/attachments/article/315/Studio%20Re
munerazioni%202012%20-%20Abstract.pdf. (discussing the key role
played by transparency in regard to the value of say-on-pay votes); see
Guido Ferrarini et al., Understanding Directors’ Pay in Europe: A
Comparative and Empirical Analysis 14-15 (EGCI Law Working Paper
126/2009, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1418463.
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increased shareholder oversight.178 Interestingly, proxy advisors
have been found to have a remarkable impact on the outcome of sayon-pay proposals, and a clear correlation has been found between
negative proxy advisor recommendations and lower vote results. In
the 2019 proxy season, for instance, “in the FTSE MIB, the five
remuneration reports with the lowest level of support all received a
negative recommendation from the majority of the [most
significant] proxy advisors.”179
Further still, the (previously) non-binding nature of say-on-pay
votes has not been found to reduce investors’ oversight incentive.
Rather, precatory say-on-pay, even if well below a majority vote,
has seemed to exert a disciplining effect on the remuneration
committees within the board of directors, given that shareholder
resolutions adopted with relatively high against and withhold votes
signal lack of trust with the directors and expose the board to
adverse reputational effects.180 Therefore, say-on-pay can also serve
to support fruitful shareholder-director dialogue as a form of
engagement, quite the same way as so-called withhold or vote-no
campaigns have proven to do in the United States. 181 It remains to
be seen whether, and if so how, the transition towards binding sayon-pay votes will change investors’ attitude on investee companies’
compensation practices.182 When looking at binding say-on-pay

178

See Ferri & Maber, supra note 175, at 530 (finding that say-onpay can have a disciplining effect in that it induces ex-ante changes in
remuneration policies aimed at limiting votes: all in all) (“UK investors
perceived say on pay to be a value enhancing monitoring mechanism and
were successful in using say on pay votes to pressure firms to remove
controversial pay practices and increase the sensitivity of pay to poor
performance”).
179
Georgeson, Georgeson’s 2019 Proxy Season Review 97 (2019),
https://www.georgeson.com/it/2019-season-review.
180
See Ferrarini et al., supra note 177, at 17-18.
181
See Ferri & Maber, supra note 175, at 531.
182
Based on Article 7(2)(b) of Legislative Decree no 49/2019
(transposing SRD II into national law), the updated version of Article 123ter CLF which includes binding say-on-pay on remuneration policies
applies only starting from the 2020 proxy season. See D.L. 49/2019 (It.).
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that was already in place at publicly listed banks and insurance
companies, it should be noticed that comparatively lower levels of
dissent have been regarded as motivating more responsible
shareholder voting.183

B. SLATE VOTING
Beyond say-on-pay, director elections have become the main
target of institutional investors, both domestic and foreign, at Italian
listed companies.184 This is chiefly a consequence of the enactment
of slate voting, on the one hand, and the record date regime for
shareholder voting on the other. Crucially, director elections at
publicly listed companies feature a substantive convergence of
foreign and domestic institutional investor votes on the slates
submitted by Italian asset managers through Assogestioni, with
institutional investors’ votes often coming quite close to the votes
cast by the major stakeholders in the company.
Even though slate voting was introduced earlier,185 until 2010,
institutional investors were only able to appoint corporate board
members within a small group of listed companies.186 As a matter
of fact, Italian institutions concentrated the submission of slates of
director nominees on a limited number of major issuers featuring
better relative performance and better corporate governance, as well

183

See Belcredi et al., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at

32.
184
See Massimo Belcredi & Guido Ferrarini, The European
Corporate Governance Framework: Issues and Perspectives 47 (ECGI
Law Working Paper no. 214/2013, 2013),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264990. Such
finding is in line with the wider European context. See Mallin, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 192 (reporting that resolutions in most
EU countries show “a clear emphasis being placed on board composition
and the appointment of directors to the board”).
185
See supra Part III.C.3.
186
Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 19–20.
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as on longer-term investee companies.187 However, since 2010,
following the introduction of the record date system,188 participation
by institutional investors in voting at board elections has increased
significantly and, over the years, a growing number of directors and
statutory auditors have been elected by institutional investors. 189
Moreover, several bylaws, especially at larger corporations, have
actually made room for two or three minority-appointed directors,
and the average number of directors appointed by minorities is
approximately two.190 Currently, 100 out of 232 listed companies’
boards include at least one minority-appointed director.191
Minority-appointed directors represent, on average, 17% of the
members of the boards where they are present.192 At the same time,
the boards of statutory auditors at 112 listed companies include at
least one minority-appointed member.193
As mentioned above, owing to the enabling role played by
Assogestioni in the process of selecting director nominees, a
significant proportion of minority-elected directors have been
picked from the lists coordinated by the Association. In 2019, sixtyfour slates of director nominees were submitted to the vote by
minority institutions, appointing seventy-six candidates in forty-

187
Such finding further suggested that institutions might have wished
to concentrate engagement efforts on a small number of major firms also
due to “political” and lobbying intents. See Belcredi & Enriques, supra
note 63, at 20 and 30; Belcredi et al., supra note 144, at 414.
188
See supra Part III.C.5.
189
Belcredi & Enriques, supra note 63, at 21.
190
Piergaetano Marchetti et al., Dissenting Directors, 18 EUR. BUS.
ORG. L. REV. 659 (2017).
191
Assonime, La Corporate Governance in Italia: Autodisciplina,
Remunerazioni e Comply-or-Explain’ [Corporate governance in Italy: Soft
law, remunerations and comply-or-explain] 37 (2019),
http://www.assonime.it/attivita-editoriale/studi/Pagine/note-e-studi-12019.aspx; CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note 17, at 17.
192
CONSOB REPORT 2019, supra note 17, at 17.
193
Id.
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nine listed companies.194 It should be noticed that, although the
shareholdings of the Italian institutional investors that formally
submit the lists do not exceed, on average, 3.5% of the votes cast,
the lists promoted by Assogestioni are able to catalyze the votes of
a sizeable number of Italian and foreign fellow institutional
investors, so that minority slates frequently end up receiving more
than 30%—and sometimes around 50%—of the votes cast.195 Given
the decreasing weight of Italian mutual funds in the Italian stock
market, the support of foreign institutional investors has proven to
be essential in this respect.
Altogether, collective engagement promoted by Assogestioni
with a view to board elections can be seen as a fairly effective tool
for monitoring investee companies; minority-appointed independent
directors within the board can favor some form of oversight within
the board itself, given that such directors are primarily expected to
protect minority interests, also by enhancing board disclosure. 196

V. HEDGE FUND-DRIVEN ACTIVISM AND ENGAGEMENT
While the Italian corporate governance framework is mainly
meant to empower non-activist institutional investors, one
noticeable factor that has been shaping institutional investor
ownership in Italy over the very last few years is the growing
relevance of activist hedge fund intervention. Interestingly, after the
United States, activism among large economies is “relatively most
frequent in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Switzerland (in
declining order), none of which are typically labeled as having

194
ASSOGESTIONI, STAGIONE ASSEMBLEARE 2019 [2019 Proxy
Season Review] 10 (2019),
http://www.assogestioni.it/index.cfm/3,161,12799/stagione-assembleare2019.pdf.
195
Id.
196
See, e.g., Moscariello et al., supra note 127, at 165 (finding a
positive relationship between the proportion of independent minority
directors and firm value); Piergaetano Marchetti et al., supra note 190, at
659 (finding that minority-appointed directors are more likely to dissent
than directors appointed with a majority of the votes).
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active markets for corporate control.”197 Further still, in relative
terms, activism is “less frequent [in the United States and the UK]
after adjusting for the number of listed companies than in Italy or
Germany.”198 In Italy, indeed, hedge funds have “taken position in
a great variety of listed companies regardless of the presence of
controlling shareholders.”199 Such findings may be surprising at
first sight, given that controlled companies predominate within the
Italian corporate landscape. The truth is, however, that minorityempowering shareholder rights, particularly the right to appoint
directors on the board, coupled with mainstream institutional voting
support to activist proposals,200 can be the drivers of activist
intervention at controlled companies which feature a significant
proportion of institutional investors in the shareholder base,
especially where de facto control is in place, as they indeed have
proven to be in the Italian context. The presence of U.S. institutional
investors in the shareholder base seems to provide further support

197
Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An
International Study, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2933, 2940 (2017).
198
Id.
199
Erede, supra note 161, at 354 (further noting that “differences in
the ownership structure of the target companies also seem to have had no
impact on activists’ investment choices”: Ibid 358). See also Belcredi &
Enriques, supra note 63, at 20–22, 31 (noticing the rise, in recent years, of
hedge funds successfully resorting to legal tools and remedies made
available by reforms in the last two decades to aggressively target listed
companies engaging in controversial transactions); Elisabetta Bellini,
Hedge Fund Activism in Italy, 9 J. Corp. L. Stud. 201, 231, 233 (2009).
200
See, e.g., J.P. Morgan, The activist revolution. Understanding and
navigating a new world of heightened investor scrutiny 8 (2015),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320693986586.pdf, (emphasizing
that “[n]o other factor has had as significant an impact on the success of
shareholder activism as the changing attitude and behavior of traditional
long-only investors: public pension funds, institutional investors and
money managers.”).
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for activism. In effect, U.S. institutional investors exert significant
influence on the level of activism in non-U.S. countries.201
Against this backdrop, while the increase in the presence of
activist investors on the Italian capital markets can further
incentivize mainstream institutions’ active conduct, it may also, to
some extent, influence the role played by non-activist institutional
investors in Italy. Due to their different incentive structures, activist
investors are more willing than mainstream institutions to engage in
costly, and often confrontational, initiatives aimed at bringing about
a change in the target company's policies or management. Hence,
even non-activist institutional investors might be willing to support
activist intervention in spite of the collaborative and constructivist
stance for shareholder engagement adopted by Italian legislature and
soft law principles.
Put differently, the rise in activists’
interventions could lead to the diffusion of an engagement approach
quite different from that which EU and Italian law aims to stimulate.
One illustrative example concerns the 2018 battle for control of
Telecom Italia between Vivendi and Elliott Advisors, showing that
this form of “cooperation” between activist and mainstream
institutional investors can enhance the relevance of activist-driven
initiatives and lead to a more confrontational model of engagement
in Italy. In the Telecom Italia case, indeed, the majority of
mainstream institutional investors decided to side with Elliott
Advisors and the cooperation between activist and non-activist
institutional investors helped Elliott Advisors to appoint ten out of
fifteen members on the board at Telecom Italia.202 In effect,

201 See Becht et al., supra note 197, at 2968–69 (noticing that “[t]he
increase and spread of U.S. foreign institutional holdings has significantly
contributed to hedge fund activism becoming a global phenomenon”).
202 Whether the diffusion of such initiatives can be beneficial for the
Italian capital markets is difficult to predict, as the potential effects of
increased shareholder activism also depend, to a certain extent, on the
ownership structure of target companies. See Gaia Balp, Activist
Shareholders at De Facto Controlled Companies, in 13 Brooklyn J. Corp.
Fin. & Com. L. 348 (2019) (noting that, as far as de facto controlled
companies are concerned, “an activist's power to exert substantial
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enhanced institutional investor participation at shareholders
meetings renders voting outcomes more difficult to predict, even in
contexts of concentrated ownership. This in turn can increase the
potential for successful activist intervention. At de facto controlled
companies, where corporate control is contestable, this might
especially be the case where shareholder slates are submitted to be
voted on at director elections, proxy fights occur, or the general
meeting is to vote on material related party transactions.

VI. CONCLUSION
The case of Italy quite clearly shows that institutional investors
can play a major role within contexts of concentrated corporate
ownership, and that legislature can greatly contribute to favoring
institutions’ active ownership by creating a friendly regulatory
environment.
Indeed, despite high levels of ownership
concentration of publicly listed companies, institutional investors
have grown into prominent players on the Italian corporate
governance scene. Different factors, both economic and regulatory,
contributed to bringing about such outcome. Within a context
dominated by the principal-principal agency problem, regulatory
action taken over time has been one strongly shaped around
empowering minority shareholders, whether by enhancing minority
shareholder rights or supporting minorities’ actual ability and
willingness to exercise shareholder rights.
Moreover,
intermediaries’ regulation has focused on institutional investors and
asset managers as owners and has enhanced their oversight role,
especially as to voting obligations. Coupled with support provided
by self-regulation, particularly the Italian Stewardship Principles,
these factors have driven institutional investors to become more
active owners and more engaged stewards at Italian listed
companies.

influence over the company's management premised on a small equity
stake, coupled with the presence of a much larger, but (theoretically)
disempowered, blockholder is likely to cause instability at the corporategovernance level”).
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Particularly, say-on-pay votes, enhanced shareholder oversight
of related party transactions, and slate voting for director elections,
alongside the pivotal effect of the record date regime on boosting
institutions’ participation in the shareholders meeting, have proven
most successful at driving increased institutional investor
engagement with Italian listed companies. Moreover, say-on-pay
votes, related party transaction oversight, and slate voting have
proven to mutually combine in the Italian practice of shareholder
engagement. First, say-on-pay is a tool complimentary for minority
representation on the board of directors to foster institutional
investor stewardship. In fact, the presence of minority-elected
directors within the board’s remuneration committee has been found
to positively correlate with increased institutional investor
participation in the shareholder meetings, and higher levels of
transparency concerning the remuneration policies were quite often
achieved as a response to relevant against and withhold say-on-pay
votes. Second, minority board representation ensured by slate
voting can improve self-dealing oversight since ex ante independent
scrutiny of related party transactions is required. Additionally, at
Italian listed companies, the presence of minority elected directors
has actually had a positive impact on the adequacy of internal
procedures for addressing related-party transactions.
On the other hand, Italian experience with director elections
through slate voting suggests that coordinated engagements by
institutional investors can have a positive impact on investee
companies. The Italian Stewardship Principles emphasize the
relevance of collective engagements, and Assogestioni, the Italian
non-profit asset manager association, greatly contributed to
developing a peculiar pathway for collective engagements which
leverages slate voting to catalyze investors’ stewardship efforts. By
redistributing engagement-associated costs among the affiliated
investors, Assogestioni promotes shareholder collaboration within a
formalized framework for the selection of candidates and the
submission of short lists of director nominees as a tool for
shareholder monitoring. As a matter of fact, slate voting, subsidized
by the proactive role played by Assogestioni as an enabling entity
and combined with the incentivizing effect of the record date
system, has proven to be a fundamental lever by which to support
mainstream institutional investors’ collective action as a viable and
cost-effective pathway for engaging and monitoring investee
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companies in Italy. An ever-growing number of directors and
statutory auditors are actually elected by institutional investors.

